v. 108, 807 P.2d 728 (1991), was based on the “‘often-expressed understanding’ that the term ‘person’ does not include the sovereign, and statutes using the word[, such as 42 U.S.C. § 1983,] are interpreted to exclude it” (quoting Will , 491 U.S. at 64)), overruled in part on other grounds by Nunez v. City of North Las Vegas , 116 Nev. 535, 1 P.3d 959 (2000). [9] See Will , 491 U.S. at 73 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“The idea that the word ‘persons’ ordinarily excludes the sovereign can be traced to the ‘familiar principle that the King is not bound by any act of Parliament unless he be named therein by special and particular words.’” (quoting Savings Bank v. United States , 86 U.S. 227, 239 (1873))). [10] Vermont Agency of Natural Resources , 529 U.S. at 781 (quoting Cooper Corp. , 312 U.S. at 604-05). [11] NRS 357.200 to 357.230; see also Harris Assocs. v. Clark County Sch. Dist. , 119 Nev. 638, 642, 81 P.3d 532, 534 (2003) (recognizing that a statute’s language “‘should not be read to produce absurd or unreasonable results’” (quoting Glover v. Concerned Citizens for Fuji Park , 118 Nev. 488, 492, 50 P.3d 546, 548 (2002), overruled in part on other grounds by Garvin v. Dist. Ct. , 118 Nev. 749, 59 P.3d 1180 (2002))). [12] International Game Tech. , 122 Nev. at ___, ___ P.3d at ___. [13] Cook County v. United States ex rel. Chandler , 538 U.S. 119 (2003); Vermont Agency of Natural Resources , 529 U.S. 765. [14] See generally Custom Cabinet Factory of N.Y. v. Dist. Ct. , 119 Nev. 51, 54, 62 P.3d 741, 742-43 (2003) (recognizing that state courts are free to interpret state law, despite contrary interpretations of similar federal law by federal courts). [15] See generally Edgington v. Edgington , 119 Nev. 577, 584, 80 P.3d 1282, 1288 (2003) (recognizing that, unless contrary to legislative intent, state statutes substantially similar to previously enacted federal statutes should be construed in the same manner). [16] Vermont Agency of Natural Resources , 529 U.S. at 783-84. [17] Id. [18] Id. at 781-82. [19] We reject Simonian’s argument that the Supreme Court’s decisions are inapplicable to this issue, but that instead, this court should adhere to the reasoning set forth in LeVine v. Weis , 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 439 (Ct. App. 1998), as further explained on appeal after remand , 108 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562 (2001). In Weis , the California Court of Appeal considered whether an action could be maintained under California’s FCA against a governmental agency, namely, a county juvenile hall’s school. Id. at 440. In determining that the action was allowable, the California court pointed out that the governmental agency fit within the California FCA’s express definition of a “person” subject to liability, and it distinguished Supreme Court cases based on the particular circumstances at play in Weis , especially as there was no indication in that case that the State would in any way be responsible for paying any judgment against the agency. Id. at 440, 443. But Weis did not present a situation identical to this one, in which a state entity is essentially being sued to recover funds for the State. Further, state entities do not fit within the meaning of “person” under Nevada’s FCA. [20] NRS 396.020. [21] Nev. Const. art. 11, §§ 4, 7; see also University System v. DR Partners , 117 Nev. 195, 205, 18 P.3d 1042, 1049 (2001) (recognizing that “the sovereign functions of higher education repose in the Board of Regents,” which has been constitutionally entrusted to control and manage the University). [22] Nev. Const. art. 11, § 6. [23] Id. ; NRS 396.370(2). Despite Simonian’s contention that UCCSN can use nonstate funds to reimburse the state, any judgment against UCCSN may implicate the state’s general fund. Nev. Const. art. 11, § 6; NRS 396.370(2); see also Meza v. Lee , 669 F. Supp. 325, 328 (D. Nev. 1987) (pointing out that a judgment against UNR and the Board of Regents would be paid out of the State’s general fund (citing Johnson v. University of Nevada , 596 F. Supp. 175, 177-78 (D. Nev. 1984))). [24] NRS 396.505. [25] NRS 396.120. [26] NRS 396.380; DR Partners , 117 Nev. at 203, 18 P.3d at 1047. [27] See NRS 396.809–.885 (University Securities Law). In DR Partners , 117 Nev. at 204 & n.25, 18 P.3d at 1048 & n. 25, we pointed out that the university securities law, while defining the Board of Regents and the University of Nevada as political subdivisions, is specific only to those provisions, and we recognized that “UCCSN is not a political subdivision.” [28] 107 Nev. 108, 112-13, 807 P.2d 728, 731 (1991). [29] Cf. Graham v. State , 956 P.2d 556, 562 (Colo. 1998) (considering three factors in determining whether an entity is a “person” or an arm of the state for § 1983 purposes: (1) the entity’s characterization under state law; (2) the degree of State control over the entity; and (3) whether any judgment ultimately would be satisfied from state funds). [30] Meza , 669 F. Supp. at 328 (pointing out that a judgment against UNR and the Board of Regents would be paid out of the State’s general fund (citing Johnson , 596 F. Supp. at 177-78)). [31] See , e.g. , NRS 543.550(2) (providing, in the context of right-of-ways over public lands, for notice to be given to the Division of State Lands and “any other agency or entity of the state owning land in the area, including the [UCCSN]”); cf. DR Partners , 117 Nev. at 204 n.25, 18 P.3d at 1048 n.25 (noting that the university securities law, while defining the Board of Regents and the University of Nevada as political subdivisions, is specific only to those provisions); NRS 396.7994, 396.803 (providing that any nonprofit corporation formed by the Board of Regents for the acquisition of real property for the future development of UNR and UNLV, respectively, is “[a] corporate agency of [UCCSN] and the Board of Regents; . . . and . . . [a] political subdivision of this state”). [32] See DR Partners , 117 Nev. at 205, 18 P.3d at 1049 (connecting education to sovereign functions); Johnson , 596 F. Supp. at 177 (“[T]he Board [of Regents] was created by the Nevada constitution to perform state functions.”). [33] See Johnson , 596 F. Supp. at 177-78 (pointing out that UCCSN is constitutionally mandated, comprehensively controlled by the Legislature, and fiscally tied to the state, and thus “operates as a branch of the Nevada State government”); accord Meza , 669 F. Supp. at 328 (concluding that UNR and the UNR Police Department are part of UCCSN, and thus entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity). [34] See , e.g. , Kashani v. Purdue University , 813 F.2d 843, 845 (7th Cir. 1987) (pointing to numerous cases determining that universities are state entities and noting that, “given the great number of cases holding state universities to be instrumentalities of the state for Eleventh Amendment purposes, it would be an unusual state university that would not receive immunity”); Graham , 956 P.2d at 563, 565-66 (noting that “several courts have held that a State’s choice of a corporate form for its colleges or universities or their governing boards does not waive sovereign immunity,” and concluding that the University of Northern Colorado was a state entity for immunity purposes even though its corporate form was similar to that of a municipality and it received limited funding from nonstate sources); 15A Am. Jur. 2d Colleges and Universities § 44, at 318 (2000) (recognizing that “universities or colleges which are public or quasi-public corporations created and existing under state law and exercising a governmental function, or their governing boards, cannot generally, in the absence of express statutory authority therefor, be sued”). [35] U.S. v. Regence Bluecross Blueshield of Utah , 334 F. Supp. 2d 1278, 1281 (D. Utah 2004). [36] Bergmann v. Boyce , 109 Nev. 670, 676, 856 P.2d 560, 564 (1993); see U.S. ex rel. Grynberg v. Praxair, Inc. , 389 F.3d 1038, 1055 (10th Cir. 2004

Vegas Law