.3d at 1160. [10] See Nev. Const. art. 6, § 6; NRS 4.370 (delineating matters over which justice courts have jurisdiction, which do not include matters involving injunctive relief); see also Edwards , 121 Nev. at ___, 124 P.3d at 1161. [11] 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(C); Edwards , 121 Nev. at ___, 124 P.3d at 1160. [12] 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3); Edwards , 121 Nev. at ___, 124 P.3d at 1161. [13] Minnesota ex rel. Hatch v. Sunbelt Comm. and Market., 282 F. Supp. 2d 976, 980 (D. Minn. 2002). [14] Cf. Parascandolo v. Christensen , 65 Nev. 578, 583, 199 P.2d 629, 631 (1948) (recognizing “‘[t]he general rule . . . that, if a court of equity obtain[s] jurisdiction of a controversy on any ground and for any purpose, it will retain jurisdiction for the purpose of administering complete relief’” (quoting Seaborn v. District Court , 55 Nev. 206, 222, 29 P.2d 500, 505 (1934))); Jasper County Lumber Co. v. Biscamp , 77 S.W.2d 571, 572 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934) (noting that a district court’s jurisdiction over suits for injunctive relief “does not necessarily depend upon the amount in controversy”). [15] See Attorney General v. NOS Communications , 120 Nev. 65, 68, 84 P.3d 1052, 1054 (2004) (discussing statutory injunctive relief). [16] S.E.C. v. Holschuh , 694 F.2d 130, 144 (7th Cir. 1982) (“In an action for a statutory injunction, once a violation has been demonstrated, the moving party need only show that there is a reasonable likelihood of future violations in order to obtain relief.” (footnote omitted)), cited in Hatch , 282 F. Supp. 2d at 980 n.2; see, e.g. , 42 Am. Jur. 2d Injunctions § 23 (2000). [17] Holschuh , 694 F.2d at 144. [18] Cf. NOS Communications , 120 Nev. at 69, 84 P.3d at 1054-55 (holding that a statutory preliminary injunction should issue upon the presentation of evidence establishing a reasonable likelihood of continuing wrongful conduct). [19] See Commodity Futures Trading Com’n v. Hunt , 591 F.2d 1211, 1220 (7th Cir. 1979) (noting that past improper conduct, while suggestive of a likelihood of future improper conduct, does not necessarily denote such, and the court, in making an inference of likelihood, should look at any relevant factors). [20] See NOS Communications , 120 Nev. at 67, 84 P.3d at 1053 (noting that requests for injunctions are directed to a court’s discretion); see also Conservation Com’n of Simsbury v. Price , 479 A.2d 187, 196 (Conn. 1984) (recognizing that, in determining whether to grant a statutory injunction, while it is the court’s duty to carry out legislative intent and the statute’s remedial purposes, the court nonetheless retains discretion and is not obligated to issue an injunction for every violation); Hatch , 282 F. Supp. 2d at 980 (granting an injunction for a TCPA violation because “it [was] evident that, absent an injunction, [defendant] would continue to violate the TCPA,” and thereby “fulfill[ing] the legislative purpose of the statute”); Szefczek v. Hillsborough Beacon , 668 A.2d 1099, 1110 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1995) (granting an injunction after finding several TCPA violations and noting that the defendant had continued to violate the TCPA several times after the plaintiff had brought the problem to the defendant’s attention). [21] See generally Dopps v. Dopps , 636 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Tex. App. 1982) (noting that, once jurisdiction has properly attached upon the filing of the suit, it may not be defeated by subsequent facts or events); Shaw v. Owen , 90 So. 2d 179, 181 (Miss. 1956) (recognizing that once a court accepts jurisdiction over a matter, the court may consider legal questions that fall within the court’s jurisdiction only because they are related to questions in equity, even though the equity grounds for relief prove unsuccessful); Rooney v. Weeks , 194 N.E. 666, 669 (Mass. 1935) (explaining that, once jurisdiction to hear a contractual matter had attached through an application for injunctive relief, the court retained jurisdiction to resolve issues of damages, even though the contractual basis for an injunction had expired). [22] Howlett v. Rose , 496 U.S. 356, 367 (1990); U.S. C onst . art. VI, cl. 2; see also Edwards , 121 Nev. at ___, 124 P.3d at 1160. [23] See Howlett , 496 U.S. at 372. [24] 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (2000). [25] 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3). [26] Edwards , 121 Nev. at ___, 124 P.3d at 1160; see also Intern. Science & Tech. Institute v. Inacom Comm. , 106 F.3d 1146, 1157 (4th Cir. 1997); Consumer Crusade v. Affor. Health Care Sol. , 121 P.3d 350, 355 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (recognizing that “when Congress created a private right of action that could be prosecuted in state courts, ‘if otherwise permitted by the laws or rules of court of a State,’ it was acknowledging that the states could apply their own rules of procedure to such an action”). [27] See NRS 11.190(4)(b); G and H Assocs. v. Ernest W. Hahn, Inc. , 113 Nev. 265, 272, 934 P.2d 229, 233 (1997) (noting that “[s]tatutes of limitation are procedural bars to a plaintiff’s action”). [28] See NRS 11.190(4)(b); Hahn , 113 Nev. at 272, 934 P.2d at 233; see also Edwards , 121 Nev. at ___, 124 P.3d at 1160; Accounting Outsourcing v. Verizon Wireless , 329 F. Supp. 2d 789, 802 (M.D. La. 2004) (recognizing that § 227(b)(3) of the TCPA “leaves to the states the procedural and jurisdictional questions surrounding each state’s enforcement of private rights of action”); Consumer Crusade , 121 P.3d at 355 (recognizing that states can “apply their own rules of procedure” to TCPA actions prosecuted in state courts); David L. Smith and Associates v. APT , 169 S.W.3d 816, 822 (Tex. App. 2005) (concluding that “a party may assert a private claim under the TCPA only if state law so permits” and that Texas’ applicable two-year statute of limitations applied to TCPA claims filed in Texas courts). [29] See NRS 11.190(4)(b). [30] Edwards maintains that the United States Supreme Court’s recent decision in Jones v. R. R. Donnelley & Sons Co. , 541 U.S. 369 (2004), compels this court to apply the federal, four-year statute of limitations to his TCPA claims. But Edwards mistakenly extends the holding in Jones , which is inapposite under the facts here. In Jones , the Supreme Court unequivocally stated that its decision addressed problems associated with the practice, in federal district court, of borrowing state statutes of limitations and the unnecessary work this created for federal judges, noting that its holding “best serve[d] Congress’ interest in alleviating the uncertainty inherent in the practice of borrowing state statutes of limitations [and] . . . [i]t spare[d] federal judges . . . the need to identify the appropriate statute of limitations.” Id. at 382. Neither that holding, nor the analysis underlying it applies here—to a private TCPA claim brought in state court. [31] Wantz v. Redfield , 74 Nev. 196, 326 P.2d 413 (1958). [32] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 222A (1965); W. Page Keeton et al. Prosser and Keeton on The Law of Torts § 15, at 90 (5th ed. 1984) [hereinafter Prosser & Keeton ]. We note that, although requiring respondents to pay the full value of a sheet of paper and the toner on it seems insignificant, this remedy, in general, is harsh, reserved for the most severe interferences with personal property. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 226 cmt. d; Prosser & Keeton , supra , at 90. [33] Restatement (Second) of Torts § 226; Prosser & Keeton , supra note 32, at 100-01. [34] Cf. Universal Underwriters v. Lou Fusz Auto. Network , 300 F. Supp. 2d 888, 895 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (stating that, because common-law conversion is the unauthorized assumption of the right of ownership over the personal property of another, sending an unauthorized facsimile fails to constitute common-law conversion). [35] See, e.g. , U .S. v. Wilkes , 946 F.2d 1143, 1152 (5th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the waste of judicial resources involved in remanding for speculative, nominal damages); Thompson v. Mannix , 814 S.W.2d 811 (Tex. App. 1991) (acknowledging that the lower court co

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