s differently. As this court has likewise recognized, because the TCPA allows a party to file a state court TCPA action “if otherwise permitted by [that state’s] laws or rules of court,”[25] private causes of action based on TCPA claims may be maintained in Nevada courts when consistent with Nevada’s laws and court rules.[26] One such procedural law, NRS 11.190, provides that an action on “a statute for a penalty or forfeiture” must be commenced within two years.[27] Since the TCPA imposes statutory penalties for injuries caused by its violation, NRS 11.190 imparts a two-year limitation period that displaces the residual four-year, federal statutory period.[28] Accordingly, we evaluate the timeliness of Edwards’ TCPA claim by examining whether he brought it within two years of accrual.[29] Here, the parties do not dispute that, on September 28, 2004, Edwards filed the underlying action for the first time. Nor do they dispute that the single advertisement transmitted by Cenicola-Helvin to Edwards was sent on August 6, 2002, more than two years before Edwards filed his action. Thus, we conclude that the district court did not err in granting Cenicola-Helvin’s motion to dismiss Edwards’ complaint based on NRS 11.190(4)(b)’s two-year limitation period.[30] Edwards’ state law claims Based on the same events underlying his TCPA claim, Edwards summarily asserts that Cenicola-Helvin, by transmitting the unsolicited facsimile advertisement to him, “stole [his] paper and ink[ ]” and that this act constitutes conversion. Conversion is a distinct act of dominion wrongfully exerted over personal property in denial of, or inconsistent with, title or rights therein or in derogation, exclusion or defiance of such rights.[31] Yet, conversion generally is limited to those severe, major, and important interferences with the right to control personal property that justify requiring the actor to pay the property’s full value.[32] Applying these principles and construing all reasonable inferences in Edwards’ favor, we conclude that the district court properly determined that Edwards failed to demonstrate the elements of conversion. Specifically, Edwards’ hyperbolic, yet cursory, factual allegations fail to establish that Cenicola-Helvin intentionally destroyed or radically damaged his facsimile paper and toner.[33] The mere damage that may have occurred to Edwards’ paper and toner when his personal facsimile machine printed the one unwelcomed advertisement falls short of destruction or material alteration. Edwards thus failed to allege facts constituting conversion.[34] We note, moreover, that any damage to Edwards’ paper and toner that occurred from a single facsimile advertisement was merely technical and so inconsiderable as to require the application of the common-law doctrine de minimis non curiat lex (“the law does not concern itself with trifles”).[35] This maxim provides a sensible limit where, as here, the amount of damages alleged seems so insignificant that it cannot give rise to a viable property damage claim.[36] Thus, concerning Edwards’ conversion claim, even if Edwards had made sufficient allegations, there would exist no reasonable basis on which to remand the matter. Further, as common-law principles limit viable claims for private nuisance to substantial interferences with the use and enjoyment of real property,[37] Edwards, for the same reasons, failed to sufficiently allege a claim for private nuisance. The district court therefore correctly dismissed Edwards’ conversion and private nuisance claims.[38] The district court’s award of attorney fees as sanctions Finally, Edwards challenges the district court’s order awarding Cenicola-Helvin $250 in attorney fees after determining that Edwards frivolously challenged, through a motion to amend, the “with prejudice” language in the order dismissing his complaint. In his motion and at the subsequent hearing, Edwards persisted in asserting his arguments, by that time rendered superfluous, that his TCPA claim was not time-barred. NRS 18.010(2)(b) and NRCP 11 authorize the district court to grant an award of attorney fees as sanctions against a party who pursues a claim without reasonable ground.[39] We have consistently recognized that “[t]he decision to award attorney fees is within the [district court’s] sound discretion . . . and will not be overturned absent a ‘manifest abuse of discretion.’”[40] Having considered the record in light of the broad discretion left to the district court in this area, we conclude that the district court’s award of attorney fees as sanctions was not a manifest abuse of its discretion.[41] CONCLUSION Since the district court has original jurisdiction over injunction requests, a complaint properly requesting both monetary and injunctive relief for TCPA violations invokes the court’s jurisdiction over that complaint. O0nce acquired, the court’s jurisdiction is not lost on denial of injunctive relief, even if the claim for monetary damages is less than the jurisdictional threshold in place at the time the complaint is filed. Accordingly, in Docket No. 44135, although we affirm the portion of the district court’s order denying injunctive relief based on Edwards’ failure to show a likelihood of future violations, we reverse the portion of the order dismissing the claims for monetary relief and remand this matter for further proceedings. Further, in Docket No. 44483, because Nevada’s two-year statute of limitations applies to private TCPA claims arising in Nevada, Edwards’ TCPA claim was untimely. Additionally, we conclude that Edwards failed to allege facts demonstrating that the receipt of a single-page facsimile advertisement constituted conversion of his toner and the sheet of paper on which it was printed or that this somehow constituted a private nuisance. The district court correctly dismissed those claims. Moreover, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it awarded Cenicola-Helvin attorney fees as sanctions against Edwards’ frivolous post-judgment motion. Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s orders dismissing Edwards’ complaint and awarding attorney fees as sanctions. **********FOOTNOTES********** [1] 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2000). [2] 47 U.S.C. §§ 227(b)(1)(C), (b)(3) (2000) (making it unlawful, with enumerated exceptions, for any person “to use any telephone facsimile machine . . . to send an unsolicited advertisement to a telephone facsimile machine,” and allowing a person to bring an action, based on this prohibited conduct, in an appropriate state court if the laws or court rules of that state permit such an action); Edwards v. Direct Access, LLC , 121 Nev. ___, 124 P.3d 1158 (2005). [3] The requested $3,000 was comprised of $500 for each unsolicited facsimile, plus an additional $2,000 in trebled damages for willful or knowing conduct. See 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(3) (providing that the consumer may recover either the actual monetary loss due to a TCPA violation or $500 and the district court has discretion to “increase the amount of the award to an amount equal to not more than 3 times the amount [otherwise] available,” upon finding willful or knowing violation). [4] Edwards also attempts to appeal from the district court’s orders denying his post-judgment motions to amend the judgment and for reconsideration. Those orders are not appealable. See NOLM, LLC v. County of Clark , 120 Nev. 736, 745, 100 P.3d 658, 664 (2004); Landex, Inc. v. State, Dep’t Commerce , 92 Nev. 177, 547 P.2d 315 (1976). [5] See Vacation Village v. Hitachi America , 110 Nev. 481, 874 P.2d 744 (1994). [6] Edgar v. Wagner , 101 Nev. 226, 699 P.2d 110 (1985). [7] Breliant v. Preferred Equities Corp. , 109 Nev. 842, 845, 858 P.2d 1258, 1260 (1993). [8] Hampe v. Foote , 118 Nev. 405, 408, 47 P.3d 438, 439 (2002). [9] See 2003 Nev. Stat., ch. 160, §§ 2, 7, at 849, 853; see also Edwards , 121 Nev. at ___, 124 P

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