es and its officers Mark Cenicola and Jeff R. Helvin (collectively, Cenicola-Helvin) allegedly transmitted an unsolicited advertisement for website development services to Edwards’ personal facsimile machine. Edwards’ complaint alleged that transmitting the facsimile advertisement, without permission, violated the TCPA, NRS 40.140(1) (statutory nuisance), certain provisions of NRS Chapter 598 (state deceptive trade practices), and constituted intrusion, conversion, and private nuisance. Cenicola-Helvin moved to dismiss the complaint, asserting, among other arguments, that Nevada’s two-year statute of limitations barred Edwards’ TCPA claims and that, additionally, he had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Pursuant to Cenicola-Helvin’s motion, the district court conducted a hearing, limiting argument to whether Nevada’s two-year statute of limitations precluded Edwards’ TCPA claims. Thereafter, and without further elaboration, the district court granted Cenicola-Helvin’s motion and dismissed Edward’s entire complaint. Subsequently, Edwards moved to amend the district court’s dismissal order, so that it would provide that his claims were dismissed “without prejudice.” On request, the district court determined that Edwards’ motion was frivolous and denied it, awarding Cenicola-Helvin attorney fees as a sanction for Edwards having filed a meritless motion. Edwards appeals.[4] DISCUSSION Our review of the orders dismissing Edwards’ complaints is rigorous,[5] as this court, in determining whether Edwards has set forth allegations sufficient to make out elements of a right to relief,[6] accepts all factual allegations in his complaint as true and construes all inferences in his favor.[7] The dismissal of Edwards’ complaints was proper only if his allegations, even as presumed true, would not entitle him to relief.[8] Having reviewed the record in light of this standard, we conclude that, in Docket No. 44135, the district court properly denied Edwards’ request for injunctive relief but erroneously dismissed his claims for monetary damages. We further conclude that, in Docket No. 44483, the district court did not err in granting Cenicola-Helvin’s motion to dismiss. Docket No. 44135 District court jurisdiction over complaints requesting both monetary and injunctive relief When Edwards’ suit against Emperor’s Garden was filed in 2004, complaints for monetary damages were required to seek amounts that exceeded $7,500 to meet the district court’s jurisdictional threshold.[9] The district court possesses original jurisdiction, however, over claims for injunctive relief.[10] In his complaint, Edwards properly alleged TCPA violations by asserting that Emperor’s Garden had transmitted two unsolicited advertisements to his personal facsimile machine,[11] and he permissibly requested both monetary and injunctive relief for those violations.[12] In so doing, he invoked the district court’s original jurisdiction over injunction requests. Further, the record does not indicate that Edwards’ request for statutory injunctive relief was improperly or fraudulently made solely to invoke the district court’s jurisdiction. As one federal court has recognized, the TCPA’s purpose in allowing injunctive relief is “to protect the privacy interests of residential telephone subscribers” by preventing “calls that violate the statute.”[13] Thus, as Edwards’ requests for monetary damages and his request for injunctive relief arose out of the same two facsimile events, the district court properly acquired jurisdiction over the entirety of Edwards’ complaint, regardless of whether the monetary threshold was met.[14] Claims for statutory injunctive relief The district court apparently recognized that jurisdiction was properly acquired through Edwards’ request for injunctive relief and determined that Edwards was not entitled to such relief. Edwards asserts that because statutory injunctive relief is available for TCPA violations, the district court improperly based its denial of the requested injunction on equitable factors and thus improperly required a showing of irreparable injury and an inadequate legal remedy.[15] As recognized by some of the authority Edwards points to, however, even a party requesting an injunction, who has shown that the statutory conditions have been met, must demonstrate a likelihood of future violations before an injunction will issue.[16] In assessing whether future violations are likely, the court must consider the totality of the circumstances concerning the alleged violation. In so doing, the court may examine any relevant factors, including (1) the gravity of any harm caused, (2) the extent of and motivation behind the violator’s participation in the wrongful conduct, (3) the isolated or recurrent nature of the violation, and (4) whether the violator has recognized culpability and/or sincerely promised that future violations will not occur.[17] Here, while the court improperly looked to traditional equitable grounds in considering a statutory injunction request,[18] it also explored some of the aforementioned factors in determining that an injunction was not warranted. In particular, the court noted that only two violations were alleged to have occurred and that those alleged violations had occurred nearly three and one-half years earlier. Further, the court properly examined the harm any violations caused. And in the documents before the district court, respondents indicated that any offending conduct had been halted. Edwards admitted that he had received nothing else from respondents and seemingly agreed with the court that whether respondents would send him any unsolicited facsimiles in the future was unknown.[19] Thus, the district court did not abuse its discretion when it determined that Edwards had not demonstrated that an injunction was warranted.[20] When the district court denied injunctive relief, however, it did not thereby lose its jurisdiction to consider Edwards’ claims for monetary damages.[21] Accordingly, while we affirm the district court’s order to the extent that it denied injunctive relief, we reverse that portion of the order dismissing Edwards’ statutory and common-law claims for monetary damages and remand this matter for further proceedings. Docket No. 44483 In Docket No. 44483, the district court dismissed Edwards’ action under NRS 11.190(4)(b), which requires a party to commence “[a]n action upon a statute for a penalty or forfeiture” within two years from when the cause of action accrued; Edwards failed to file his complaint within two years after having received the facsimiles. According to Edwards, because a federal statute imparts a four-year limitation period on federal-law-based actions and his action was based on the TCPA—a federal law—the court erred in applying the Nevada statute of limitations to his complaint. Applying Nevada’s statute of limitations to private TCPA actions Generally, federal laws like the TCPA are enforceable in state courts because, as the Supreme Court has recognized, under the United States Constitution “[t]he Supremacy Clause makes those laws ‘the supreme Law of the Land,’ and charges state courts with a coordinate responsibility to enforce that law according to their regular modes of procedure.”[22] But, because states have significant latitude to establish the structure and jurisdiction of their own courts, federal law must take state courts as it finds them.[23] The federal statute of limitations thus defers to state law, stating that “[e]xcept as otherwise provided by law, a civil action arising under an Act of Congress enacted after [December 1, 1990] may not be commenced later than [four] years after the cause of action accrues.”[24] Since Congress enacted the TCPA after December 1, 1990, the federal four-year statute of limitations applies to TCPA claims unless another law provide

Vegas Law