345, 348 (1995). The Albioses also argue that the offers of judgment are invalid because they did not include all of the damages that a successful constructional defect claimant is entitled to recover under NRS 40.655, the most important being prejudgment interest. However, the Albioses failed to raise this issue below, and therefore, we do not consider this issue on appeal. Lentz , 111 Nev. at 308 n.2, 890 P.2d at 785 n.2; Montesano v. Donrey Media Group , 99 Nev. 644, 650 n.5, 668 P.2d 1081, 1085 n.5 (1983). [15] Additionally, although not applicable in this action, the Legislature amended NRS Chapter 40 in 2003 to address offers of judgment. NRS 40.650(4) now provides that “[n]othing in this section prohibits an offer of judgment pursuant to Rule 68 of the Nevada Rules of Civil Procedure or NRS 17.115 if the offer of judgment includes all damages to which the claimant is entitled pursuant to NRS 40.655.” We have said that “[w]here a former statute is amended, or a doubtful interpretation of a former statute rendered certain by subsequent legislation, it has been held that such [an] amendment is persuasive evidence of what the Legislature intended by the first statute.” Sheriff v. Smith , 91 Nev. 729, 734, 542 P.2d 440, 443 (1975); accord Beazer Homes Nevada, Inc. v. Dist. Ct. , 120 Nev. 575, 580-81, 97 P.3d 1132, 1135-36 (2004). Although this statute has only a prospective effect and is inapplicable here, Nevada Power v. Metropolitan Development Co. , 104 Nev. 684, 686, 765 P.2d 1162, 1163 (1988), the amendment demonstrates that our interpretation of the interrelation between NRS 40.655, NRCP 68, and NRS 17.115 comports with legislative intent. [16] See Bowyer v. Taack , 107 Nev. 625, 627, 817 P.2d 1176, 1177 (1991) (holding similarly where appellant claimed that she was entitled to recover attorney fees under NRS 18.010, even though NRCP 68(f) and NRS 17.115(4) foreclosed such a recovery), overruled in part on other grounds by McCrary v. Bianco , 122 Nev. ___, 131 P.3d 573 (2006). [17] The district court did not address whether Horizon’s offers of judgment were invalid because they were joint, unapportioned offers. Instead, the district court mistakenly addressed the validity of the offers of judgment under Beattie v. Thomas , 99 Nev. 579, 588-89, 668 P.2d 268, 274 (1983). Beattie is inapplicable to determine whether an offer is valid to trigger the penalty provisions of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. Instead, Beattie applies after a district court finds that an offeree failed to obtain a more favorable jury verdict than the offer tendered and merely guides the district court’s discretion to award attorney fees. [18] Horizon relies on our decision in Uniroyal Goodrich Tire v. Mercer , 111 Nev. 318, 890 P.2d 785 (1995), superseded by statute as stated in RTTC Communications v. Saratoga Flier , 121 Nev. ___, 110 P.3d 24 (2005), and argues that offers of judgment need not be apportioned because the Albioses had a unity of interest, had jointly sued Horizon, had the same attorney, the same damages, and made their own joint offer of judgment. Horizon’s reliance on Uniroyal is misplaced. Uniroyal was decided before we amended NRCP 68 in 1998 and before the Legislature amended NRS 17.115 in 1999. NRCP 68 (replaced effective October 27, 1998); 1999 Nev. Stat., ch. 258, §§ 1-3, at 1102-05 (amending NRS 17.115 effective May 24, 1999); RTTC Communications , 121 Nev. at ___, 110 P.3d at 29. Thus, we follow the requirements of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115, and not Uniroyal when determining whether an unapportioned offer of judgment is valid. [19] Bowyer , 107 Nev. at 627-28, 817 P.2d at 1178. [20] Id. at 628, 817 P.2d at 1178. [21] Paramount Ins. v. Rayson & Smitley , 86 Nev. 644, 649, 472 P.2d 530, 533 (1970). [22] See Fick v. Fick , 109 Nev. 458, 461, 851 P.2d 445, 448 (1993) (stating that married couple may hold property as joint tenants and that property so held is separate property of each spouse); see also Forrest v. Forrest , 99 Nev. 602, 605, 668 P.2d 275, 277 (1983) (similar). [23] We view this case as distinguishable from our decision in Lentz v. I.D.S. Financial Services , 111 Nev. 306, 890 P.2d 783 (1995). In Lentz , we held an offer of judgment invalid because, although apportioned between the spouses, the offer was impliedly conditioned upon both spouses’ acceptance. Id. at 308-09, 890 P.2d at 784-85. However, Lentz was decided prior to the amendment of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 and, thus, did not involve the same factors for unapportioned offers as currently exist. [24] Although this court has never directly addressed this issue, in Pombo v. Nevada Apartment Ass’n , 113 Nev. 559, 563, 938 P.2d 725, 728 (1997), we concluded that a new, valid offer under NRCP 68 filed four days after a previous, invalid offer, was controlling for purposes of NRCP 68. However, our decision in Pombo was partially shaped by the fact that the new, valid offer was suggestive that the offeror desired to correct the defects of the first offer. Id. Seemingly contrary to Pombo , we concluded in Nava v. Dist. Ct. , 118 Nev. 396, 398, 46 P.3d 60, 62 (2002), that an offer of judgment is irrevocable and cannot be withdrawn or modified within the ten-day acceptance period of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. This contradiction further supports that Pombo was primarily based on the invalidity of the first offer. Laura T. Kidwell, J.D., Construction of State Offer of Judgment Rule—Issues Concerning Revocation and Succession , 116 A.L.R. 5th 433, § 16 (2004). Thus, Pombo , although supportive of our position today, is not wholly controlling and cannot be extended beyond situations where a successive offer of judgment is served to correct a prior, invalid offer of judgment. [25] NRCP 68(e); NRS 17.115(3). [26] NRS 17.115’s legislative history is unenlightening on whether successive offers extinguish previous offers. [27] Distefano v. Hall , 69 Cal. Rptr. 691, 695 (Ct. App. 1968). [28] Id. [29] Wilson v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 85 Cal. Rptr. 2d 4, 9 (Ct. App. 1999). [30] Id. [31] Id. [32] T.M. Cobb Co., Inc. v. Superior Court , 682 P.2d 338, 340-41 (Cal. 1984). Important in this decision, however, was the fact that because section 998 was silent with regard to irrevocability, “the general rule that offers may be revoked prior to acceptance should apply.” Id. [33] Nava v. Dist. Ct. , 118 Nev. 396, 398, 46 P.3d 60, 62 (2002). [34] Kaufman v. Smith , 693 So. 2d 133, 134 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997). [35] E.g. , Dickenson v. Regent of Albuquerque, Ltd. , 815 P.2d 658, 659 (N.M. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that, based on the comments to FRCP 68, defendants were entitled to their costs from the date of their first offer of judgment, rather than their second offer of judgment). [36] Our holding today applies only to the post-trial determination of which offer is controlling for purposes of whether a party received a more favorable verdict at trial. It does not change or affect the fact that offers of judgment are irrevocable within the statutory ten-day period. [37] State Drywall v. Rhodes Design & Dev. , 122 Nev. ___, ___, 127 P.3d 1082, 1087 (2006); see also McCrary v. Bianco , 122 Nev. ___, ___, 131 P.3d 573, 577-78 (2006). [38] State Drywall , 122 Nev. at ___, 127 P.3d at 1087. [39] This figure was calculated solely for purposes of whether the Albioses recovered a more favorable verdict and does not represent the actual prejudgment interest the Albioses are entitled to. This figure represents prejudgment interest calculated at 6.25 percent (applicable period of interest is January 1, 2003, which is the period immediately preceding the judgment), for 798 days—the period between July 13, 2000 (service of the summons and complaint) and September 19, 2002 (service of Horizon’s third offer of judgment). [40] Although the district court’s reasoning in awarding the Albioses attorney fees and costs was erroneous, we will affirm the decision of the

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