judgment interest on their costs and attorney fees. We conclude that the denial of both was error. Under the plain language of NRS 17.130(1), prejudgment interest is recoverable on judgments awarding costs.[54] Prejudgment interest runs on costs from the time when the costs were incurred. Therefore, the recovering party must prove when the costs were incurred and, if the party fails to do so, interest on the costs is awarded only from date of the judgment.[55] As such, the Albioses are entitled to prejudgment interest on their costs but, on remand, the Albioses are required to prove when their costs were incurred. Should they fail to do so, they are entitled to interest from the date of the judgment only. The parties do not raise an issue regarding whether the Albioses were entitled to prejudgment interest on attorney fees. However, we conclude that the failure to award prejudgment interest on attorney fees in this case was plain error, and we will address this issue sua sponte.[56] This court has not yet addressed whether prejudgment interest is recoverable on attorney fees when attorney fees are awarded as an element of damages, as in this case. The plain language of NRS 17.130(1) states that prejudgment interest is awarded on judgments “for any debt, damages or costs.” Thus, when attorney fees are awarded as damages, they fall within the plain language of NRS 17.130(1). Accordingly, we hold that when attorney fees are awarded as an element of damages, the prevailing party is entitled to recover prejudgment interest on the attorney fees. As the attorney fees are awarded as an element of past damages, attorney fees draw interest from the time of service of the summons and complaint, as specified in NRS 17.130(2). Therefore, we reverse that portion of the district court’s decision denying the Albioses’ prejudgment interest on costs and attorney fees and remand this matter for proceedings consistent with our decision. NRS 99.040(1) versus NRS 17.115 The Albioses also argue that prejudgment interest should have been awarded under NRS 99.040(1), which provides the basis for an award of prejudgment interest in contract actions. According to the Albioses, they are entitled to interest from the time of the breach instead of from the time the complaint was served. We disagree. The Albioses asserted two theories of liability—breach of contract and negligence. In reaching its general verdict, the jury did not differentiate between the two claims, but found that the Albioses had 5 percent comparative fault and reduced the verdict accordingly. This suggests that the jury based its award on negligence rather than on the breach of contract claim. Further, NRS 99.040(1) is inapplicable when “[t]he judgments awarded to [the plaintiff] have nothing to do with any amounts ‘due’ under the terms of the . . . contract.”[57] Here, because the jury’s verdict reduced the award for comparative fault, we conclude that the judgment awarded was unrelated to the Albioses’ contract claims. Thus, the district court properly awarded prejudgment interest under NRS 17.130. However, Horizon argues that the district court erred by calculating the prejudgment interest at a flat rate of 11.5 percent per year. In determining the applicable rate, district courts are to use the base prime interest rate “as ascertained by the commissioner of Financial Institutions on January 1 or July 1, as the case may be, immediately preceding the date of judgment, plus 2 percent.”[58] Under NRS 17.130(2), prejudgment interest is calculated at “the single rate in effect on the date of judgment.”[59] Therefore, although the district court correctly calculated the interest at a fixed rate, it erred by calculating the rate in effect when the summons and complaint were served, because it should have used the rate in effect at the date of the judgment. Accordingly, we reverse and remand the prejudgment interest award for recalculation. Award of costs The Albioses argue that the district court improperly refused to award all their costs. The court awarded them $179,985 in costs, but they sought $192,708 in costs. They argue that the district court should have awarded them costs for facsimile transmissions, out-of-pocket paralegal expenses, postage, hiring a special runner, and other items. Under NRS 18.020, the prevailing party in an action alleging more than $2,500 in damages is entitled to recover all costs as a matter of right.[60] Nevertheless, we have noted that “[t]he determination of which expenses are allowable as costs is within the sound discretion of the trial court.”[61] Further, we have cautioned that because statutes permitting costs are in derogation of the common law, they should be strictly construed.[62] It was well within the district court’s discretion to find that certain of the Albioses’ costs were not allowable, and we conclude that the district court did not abuse that discretion in its costs award.[63] CONCLUSION For the above reasons, we affirm the decision of the district court regarding the Albioses’ entitlement to attorney fees and costs, but we reverse in part and remand for a recalculation of attorney fees and prejudgment interest. BECKER, MAUPIN, DOUGLAS, HARDESTY, and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur. **********FOOTNOTES********** [1] The Honorable Mark Gibbons, Justice, voluntarily recused himself from participation in the decision of this appeal. [2] McCrary v. Bianco , 122 Nev. ___, ___, 131 P.3d 573, 577 (2006); State Drywall v. Rhodes Design & Dev. , 122 Nev. ___, ___, 127 P.3d 1082, 1087 (2006). [3] 85 Nev. 345, 349-50, 455 P.2d 31, 33 (1969). [4] The Albioses also challenge the district court’s refusal to assert jurisdiction and address Horizon’s motion to amend the judgment and the Albioses’ motion for additional time to file a motion to alter or amend the judgment to correct the prejudgment interest. As we conclude that the district court incorrectly calculated prejudgment interest, this issue is moot. [5] Allianz Ins. Co. v. Gagnon , 109 Nev. 990, 993, 860 P.2d 720, 722 (1993). [6] State, Dep’t of Human Resources v. Fowler , 109 Nev. 782, 784, 858 P.2d 375, 376 (1993). [7] NRCP 68(f); NRS 17.115(4). [8] Banks v. Sunrise Hospital , 120 Nev. 822, 846, 102 P.3d 52, 68 (2004). [9] Allianz Ins. Co. , 109 Nev. at 993, 860 P.2d at 723. [10] Paramount Ins. v. Rayson & Smitley , 86 Nev. 644, 649, 472 P.2d 530, 533 (1970). [11] NRS 40.655(2). [12] Additionally, we note that “[t]he judiciary, of course, has the inherent power to govern its own procedures; and that power includes the right to adopt and promulgate rules of procedure.” Whitlock v. Salmon , 104 Nev. 24, 26, 752 P.2d 210, 211 (1988). We have also stated that this inherent power to make rules is “not only reasonable and necessary, but absolutely essential to the effective and efficient administration of our judicial system, and it is our obligation to insure that such power is in no manner diminished or compromised by the legislature.” Goldberg v. District Court , 93 Nev. 614, 617, 572 P.2d 521, 523 (1977). Interpreting NRS 40.655 as superseding NRCP 68 would diminish and compromise our power to create rules of procedure; therefore, we do not adopt this interpretation. [13] Dillard Department Stores v. Beckwith , 115 Nev. 372, 382, 989 P.2d 882, 888 (1999); Lentz v. I.D.S. Financial Services , 111 Nev. 306, 308, 890 P.2d 783, 785 (1995) (“[T]he purpose of NRCP 68 is to encourage litigants who receive offers of judgment to settle their lawsuits by forcing the offeree to ‘balance the uncertainty of receiving a more favorable judgment against the risk of receiving a less favorable judgment and being forced to pay the offeror’s costs and attorney’s fees.’” (quoting Bergmann v. Boyce , 109 Nev. 670, 678, 856 P.2d 560, 565 (1993))). [14] General Motors v. Jackson , 111 Nev. 1026, 1029, 900 P.2d

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