ess the same person is authorized to decide whether to settle the claims of all the plaintiffs to whom the offer is made and : (1) There is a single common theory of liability claimed by all the plaintiffs to whom the offer is made; (2) The damages claimed by one or more of the plaintiffs to whom the offer is made are entirely derivative of an injury to the remaining plaintiffs to whom the offer is made; or (3) The damages claimed by all the plaintiffs to whom the offer is made are entirely derivative of an injury to another person. (Emphases added.) The Albioses argue that the offers of judgment do not fall within the scope of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 because neither spouse sustained damages that are entirely derivative of an injury to the other spouse, nor did they sustain damages that are entirely derivative of an injury to another person. Additionally, the Albioses argue that Horizon must also demonstrate that the same entity, person, or group was allowed to settle the case. Addressing first the derivative damages argument, the Albioses are correct that under NRCP 68, an unapportioned offer of judgment made to multiple plaintiffs is invalid unless the damages are derivative; here the Albioses’ damages are not derivative. NRS 17.115 has the same requirement, albeit worded slightly differently. However, NRS 17.115 includes an alternative requirement that can be met instead of the derivative damages requirement—an unapportioned offer is also proper if there is a single common theory of liability claimed by all plaintiffs. This language does not appear in NRCP 68. “[A]pparent conflicts between a court rule and a statutory provision should be harmonized and both should be given effect if possible.”[19] We have previously addressed differences between NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 and concluded that when NRCP 68 is silent with respect to something addressed under NRS 17.115, “it should be interpreted harmoniously with the more specific provisions and legislative policy of NRS 17.115.”[20] Additionally, when possible, we construe statutes such that no part of the statute is turned to mere surplusage.[21] Under NRCP 68, the defendant must show that the plaintiffs’ damages are derivative. NRS 17.115, on the other hand, allows the defendant to show that there is a single common theory of liability or that the damages are in some way derivative. To construe NRS 17.115 as requiring Horizon to show that the injuries were derivative would render NRS 17.115(9)(b)(1) mere surplusage. Therefore, reading NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 in harmony and giving effect to both, we conclude that Horizon was required to demonstrate either that the Albioses asserted a single common theory of liability against Horizon or that the damages were derivative. Because the Albioses jointly sued Horizon under the same constructional defect liability theory, Horizon satisfied the first requirement necessary for a valid offer of judgment involving multiple plaintiffs. Horizon was also required to demonstrate that the same person was authorized to decide whether to settle the claims of all plaintiffs. The Albioses owned their property in joint tenancy, and they argue that, therefore, each had a separate interest in the property and that one joint tenant cannot act on behalf of the other joint tenant in controlling the other’s interest.[22] However, if it can be shown that one plaintiff is authorized to decide whether to settle the claims for all plaintiffs, joint tenancy will not preclude service of an unapportioned offer of judgment under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. In situations such as the case at bar, when a married couple jointly brings a claim under the same common theory of liability, concerning jointly owned property, we hold that as a matter of law, one plaintiff spouse is presumed to have authority to settle the claims for both plaintiff spouses. Thus, Horizon has satisfied the second requirement for serving an unapportioned offer, and its offers to the Albioses were valid.[23] Accordingly, we must next examine whether the Albioses’ verdict exceeded Horizon’s offers. Successive offers of judgment Horizon served the Albioses with three successive offers of judgment, all of which the Albioses rejected. Horizon argues that its second and third offers of judgment were more favorable than the Albioses’ verdict and, therefore, the Albioses are not entitled to attorney fees under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. We have never addressed whether successive offers of judgment extinguish previous offers of judgment or whether all offers of judgment control.[24] Thus, before we can compare the Albioses’ verdict to Horizon’s offers, we must first decide which of Horizon’s offers is controlling. Both NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 contain a provision that allows a party to serve more than one offer of judgment.[25] However, both are silent regarding the effect of successive offers.[26] Other states are split on whether successive offers of judgment extinguish previous offers of judgment or whether all offers served are controlling. Generally, it is a policy decision. After examining both positions, we conclude the better rule is that the most recent offer of judgment extinguishes all prior offers of judgment. California adopts the position that successive offers extinguish previous offers. California’s theory is that the “process of settlement and compromise is a contractual one, and the applicable principles are those relating to contracts in general.”[27] The general contractual rule on offers is that “any new offer communicated prior to a valid acceptance of a previous offer, extinguishes and replaces the prior one.”[28] Further, there is an evolutionary aspect to lawsuits and the law, in fairness, must allow the parties the opportunity to review their respective positions as the lawsuit matures. The litigants should be given a chance to learn the facts that underlie the dispute and consider how the law applies before they are asked to make a decision that, if made incorrectly, could add significantly to their costs of trial.[29] Most importantly, California concludes that the legislative purpose of offers of judgment statutes “is generally better served by a bright line rule in which the parties know that any judgment will be measured against a single valid statutory offer—i.e., the statutory offer most recently rejected—regardless of offers made earlier in the litigation.”[30] And interpreting the offer of judgment rule otherwise encourages a party to maintain a higher settlement demand on the eve of trial and refuse to settle a case that should otherwise be settled if the [party] finds comfort in the knowledge that, even if [the party] receives an award less than his or her last demand, [the party] might still enjoy the cost reimbursement benefits . . . so long as the award exceeded a lower demand made by the [party] some time during the course of the litigation. . . . “Rolling the dice” then becomes somewhat less risky and we note that lawsuits are not often settled by reducing the risk of trial.[31] Notably, California’s offer of judgment rule, California Code of Civil Procedure section 998, contains two important differences from NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. First, section 998 does not expressly permit successive offers of judgment. Second, California has interpreted, again under general contract principles, that section 998 offers are revocable prior to acceptance.[32] Contrary to section 998, NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 textually provide for successive offers and, converse to general contract principles, offers of judgment are irrevocable in Nevada.[33] These differences notwithstanding, we conclude that California’s position regarding successive offers better effectuates the purpose of offers of judgment. We note that other courts conclude that successive offers of judgment do not extinguish previous offers, reason

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