ics concerning the person that will be considered by the public body during the closed meeting.” NRS 241.033(2)(c)(1). Our holding here is consistent with this amendment. ***************************** 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 37 April 27, 2006 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA No. 41589 DIONICIO ALBIOS AND KATHRYN ALBIOS, Appellants/Cross-Respondents, vs. HORIZON COMMUNITIES, INC., Respondent/Cross-Appellant. Appeal and cross-appeal from a district court judgment, entered on a jury verdict, awarding prejudgment interest, costs, and attorney fees in a constructional defect case. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Michael A. Cherry, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded with instructions. Law Office of Donna Lee Schubert and Donna Lee Schubert, Henderson, for Appellants/Cross-Respondents. Bennion & Clayson and Kenneth M. Marias, Las Vegas; Guenther and Castronova LLP and Stephen G. Castronova, Las Vegas; Lemons Grundy & Eisenberg and Robert L. Eisenberg, Reno, for Respondent/Cross-Appellant. BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC.[1] OPINION By the Court, ROSE, C.J.: Appellants Dionicio Albios and Kathryn Albios sued respondent Horizon Communities, Inc., for constructional defects in their single-family residence located in Clark County , Nevada. Prior to trial, Horizon served the Albioses with three successive offers of judgment, which the Albioses rejected. Following a jury trial, the jury found in favor of the Albioses and awarded them $100,000, which was reduced by 5 percent for their comparative negligence. The Albioses filed a post-trial motion for attorney fees and costs under NRS 40.655. Horizon opposed the motion, arguing that, under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115, the Albioses were not entitled to attorney fees because they did not recover a more favorable verdict at trial than the rejected offers of judgment. The district court awarded the Albioses costs and partial attorney fees pursuant to NRS 40.655. Both parties appealed. We first conclude that although NRS 40.655 allows constructional defect claimants to recover attorney fees and costs as an element of damages, NRS 40.655 does not preclude application of the penalty provisions of NRCP 68(f) and NRS 17.115(4). We next conclude that successive offers of judgment extinguish previous offers and, therefore, Horizon’s last offer of judgment is controlling for purposes of NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. When prejudgment interest is appropriately added to the Albioses’ verdict,[2] the Albioses recovered more than Horizon’s last offer. Thus, the Albioses were properly awarded their attorney fees and costs. But in awarding the Albioses only $50,000 in attorney fees, the district court abused its discretion by not considering the factors set forth in Brunzell v. Golden Gate National Bank .[3] The district court also erred when calculating prejudgment interest and by disallowing prejudgment interest on costs and attorney fees. Thus, we affirm the judgment of the district court in part and reverse in part and remand for recalculation of attorney fees and prejudgment interest. FACTS The Albioses filed a complaint against Horizon, a property developer, alleging constructional defects in their single-family residence located in Clark County, Nevada. Horizon answered the complaint and denied all of the substantive allegations. Horizon then filed a third-party complaint, seeking indemnity and contribution from various subcontractors. The parties engaged in three mediations. After each of the mediations, Horizon submitted an offer of judgment to the Albioses under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115. The first offer of judgment was for $150,000, inclusive of attorney fees and costs. The second offer of judgment was for $200,001, inclusive of attorney fees and costs. The third offer of judgment was for $100,000, exclusive of attorney fees and costs. None of the offers of judgment were apportioned between Mr. and Mrs. Albios. The Albioses rejected all three offers of judgment. The Albioses also served an offer of judgment on Horizon for $187,000, exclusive of attorney fees and costs. Horizon rejected the Albioses’ offer. After trial, the jury returned a general verdict in favor of the Albioses in the amount of $100,000. The jury reduced the amount awarded to the Albioses by 5 percent for comparative negligence, resulting in a judgment of $95,000. The Albioses and Horizon then each sought attorney fees and costs through post-trial motions. Horizon filed a memorandum of costs in the amount of $126,501.56 and a motion for attorney fees in the amount of $233,287.50. Horizon argued that it was entitled to costs and attorney fees under NRCP 68 and NRS 17.115 because the Albioses had rejected an offer of judgment more favorable than the verdict that they ultimately received. The Albioses opposed both the memorandum of costs and motion for attorney fees. The Albioses also filed a memorandum of costs in the amount of $192,707.85 and a motion for attorney fees in the amount of $232,200, both of which Horizon opposed. At the district court’s request, both parties supplemented their motions with additional documentation regarding costs and then filed amended memoranda of costs and fees. During the hearing on the parties’ motions for attorney fees and costs, the district court stated, “[I]t’s amazing how plaintiffs and defendants are within a token of each other’s fees. So, there’s no way I can say the fees are not fair; fees are fair on both sides [be]cause both sides charged about the same thing.” It also stated, If I thought somebody had done something wrong or something bothered me, I’d be the first to say, gee, [Albioses], you know, you’re wanting too much. I think both sides did an admirable job considering this is a one-residence, Chapter 40 case . . . . . . . . [Albioses], I think you did an admirable job. Congratulations to you and congratulations to the defense in this matter. You did the best you could under the circumstances. The district court postponed its decision on the motions and ordered the parties to attend another settlement conference. The parties attended but were unable to resolve the matter through settlement. The Albioses then filed a supplemental request seeking $861.82 in costs and $11,500 in fees incurred as a result of post-trial matters. Horizon opposed these requests and filed its own supplement seeking additional fees in the amount of $7,350. The district court then issued its decision regarding fees and costs. It noted, This is a tough call. I’ve thought about this case and thought about it, and I think that under—if you—a strict reading of Beatt[ie] , that certainly the offer of judgment, whether it be the first, second or third one, was not one that I would consider viable under the facts and—circumstances of this particular case. These are unusual cases, these construction defect, single home, cases. Horizon asked for clarification regarding the district court’s ruling on the offers of judgment, to which the district court responded, Under Beatt[ie] they weren’t—they weren’t applicable. They weren’t—they weren’t right. I mean they just weren’t appropriate. There’s no way she could have taken those offers of judgment, not with the costs and the— . . . and the cost of repairs. The district court granted the Albioses’ motion, awarding them $50,000 in attorney fees and $179,000 in costs. With regard to the $50,000 attorney fees award, the district court stated, I’m going to give plaintiff $50,000 in attorney’s fees . . . . So I’ve cut down on the attorney’s fees substantially and I think that it’s one of those situations where having been a flat fee criminal lawyer part of my career, that sometimes we get into cases that we don’t get full value for our services. But I certainly thi

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