have received simply provided the time and date of the Psych Panel hearing and recited that the Psych Panel would have a closed meeting under NRS 241.030 to consider his “character, alleged misconduct, professional competence, or physical or mental health.” The notice did not provide Stockmeier with notice that misconduct beyond the crime for which he was convicted, especially new allegations of abuse, would be considered. Therefore, if this was in fact the notice Stockmeier received, we conclude that the notice did not comply with NRS 241.033. Further evidence will need to be elicited in the district court to judge the accuracy of Stockmeier’s complaint. CONCLUSION We conclude that the Psych Panel hearing is not an exempt quasi-judicial proceeding and is therefore subject to the open meeting law. Moreover, Stockmeier is a “person” under NRS 241.037(2) and is not required to meet the federal constitutional standing requirements of Lujan . We also conclude that prisoners forfeit some open meeting law rights while incarcerated. However, because Stockmeier attended and was the subject of the Psych Panel hearing, he validly asserts open meeting law claims, including whether he received adequate notice of the closed meeting under NRS 241.033, whether the Psych Panel held a valid closed meeting under NRS 241.030, whether the Psych Panel posted adequate public notice under NRS 241.020, and whether the Psych Panel’s posted hearing agenda complied with the open meeting law under NRS 241.020. Additional facts need to be developed in district court to fully analyze whether the Psych Panel did indeed violate the open meeting law. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court and remand this case for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. **********FOOTNOTES********** [1] Stockmeier also asserts that a conflict of interest exists because the Attorney General is defending the Psych Panel in this case but is also required to assist Stockmeier in his lawsuit under NRS 241.037 and NRS 241.040(4). This contention is without merit. NRS 241.037 and NRS 241.040(4) do not create an attorney-client relationship with persons who complain to the Attorney General about an open meeting violation, nor do they require the Attorney General to assist such persons in lawsuits filed under NRS 241.037(2). Thus, no conflict of interest exists in this case. [2] Hampe v. Foote , 118 Nev. 405, 408, 47 P.3d 438, 439 (2002). [3] Id. [4] Id. (citation omitted). [5] Keife v. Logan , 119 Nev. 372, 374, 75 P.3d 357, 359 (2003). [6] NRS 241.030(3)(a) (2002) was amended in 2005 and replaced by NRS 241.030(4)(a) (2005). Aside from the subsection change, the Legislature did not alter the judicial proceeding exception. We refer to the judicial proceeding exception as NRS 241.030(3)(a) in this opinion. [7] The Psych Panel argues that NRS 213.130 supersedes the open meeting law’s application to NRS 213.1214. NRS 213.130 provides for open meetings in parole eligibility proceedings. This argument is without merit. The open meeting provisions of NRS 213.130 apply only to parole hearings under that statute. Similarly, the Psych Panel’s argument that the doctrine of expressio unius est exclusion alterius (the mention of one is the exclusion of the other) exempts it from the open meeting law is also without merit. The open meeting law applies to meetings of all public bodies unless otherwise specified by statute. NRS 241.020(1). [8] Black’s Law Dictionary 1278-79 (8th ed. 2004). [9] Van Heukelom v. State Board , 67 Nev. 649, 655-56, 224 P.2d 313, 316 (1950). In light of our discussion today, we leave unanswered the question of whether other state agencies’ hearings are quasi-judicial proceedings. [10] Knox v. Dick , 99 Nev. 514, 518, 665 P.2d 267, 270 (1983). [11] Town of Richmond v. Wawaloam Reservation , 850 A.2d 924, 933 (R.I. 2004). [12] Arizona P. C., Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Tax Ap., Div. 1 , 558 P.2d 697, 699 (Ariz. 1976), superseded by statute as recognized by Rosenberg v. Arizona Bd. of Regents , 578 P.2d 168, 173 (Ariz. 1978) (concluding that the Arizona Legislature later amended Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-431.08.A(1) to exclude quasi-judicial proceedings from the exception). [13] Id. [14] Reed v. AMAX Coal Co. , 971 F.2d 1295, 1300 (7th Cir. 1992). [15] Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 1, § 310(5)(B) (2003). [16] NRS 241.010. [17] NRS 213.1214(1). [18] While the Psych Panel did issue a written statement, an eight-line conclusory statement noting Stockmeier’s unsatisfactory performance is not enough to constitute a formal written decision. [19] 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992). [20] The district court’s reliance on the standing requirements in Lujan may stem from Stockmeier’s complaint seeking declaratory relief. However, declaratory relief is inapplicable to Stockmeier’s claims, as he is seeking (1) a remedy for violations of his rights that have already occurred, and (2) injunctive relief to address future violations. Therefore, we do not address declaratory relief. [21] 504 U.S. at 560. [22] Valley Forge College v. Americans United , 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982). [23] 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 36, at 441-42 (2002) (footnote omitted); see Secretary of State v. Nevada State Legislature , 120 Nev. 456, 461 n.3, 93 P.3d 746, 749 n.3 (2004). [24] 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 36, at 441-42 (2002); see , e.g. , Life of the Land v. Land Use Com’n, Etc. , 623 P.2d 431, 436-41 (Haw. 1981) (finding that the Article III standing restrictions of the United States Constitution do not apply to Hawaii); Ohio Roundtable v. Taft , 773 N.E.2d 1113, 1120-23 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 2002) (allowing standing for a public right). But see City of West Linn v. LCDC , 113 P.3d 935, 937-38 (Or. Ct. App. 2005) (holding that both statutory and constitutional standing were required to enforce a statute). [25] Doe v. Bryan , 102 Nev. 523, 525, 728 P.2d 443, 444 (1986); see NRS Chapter 30 (Uniform Declaratory Judgments Act). [26] See Doe , 102 Nev. at 525-26, 728 P.2d at 444-45. [27] See Sereika v. State , 114 Nev. 142, 151, 955 P.2d 175, 180 (1998); Worldcorp v. State, Dep’t Tax. , 113 Nev. 1032, 1036, 944 P.2d 824, 827 (1997). [28] See Hantges v. City of Henderson , 121 Nev. ___, ___, 113 P.3d 848, 850 (2005) (standing under NRS 279.609); RTTC Communications v. Saratoga Flier , 121 Nev. ___, ___, 110 P.3d 24, 27 (2005) (standing under NRS 80.055). [29] Black’s Law Dictionary 1178 (8th ed. 2004). [30] State v. Quinn , 117 Nev. 709, 713, 30 P.3d 1117, 1120 (2001). [31] See Kaapu v. Aloha Tower Development Corp. , 846 P.2d 882, 888-89 (Haw. 1993) (determining that “any person” in Hawaii’s open meeting law was equally as broad). [32] Id. [33] E.g. , Nev. Const . art . 2, § 1 (felons cannot vote); id. art . 4, § 27 (persons convicted of “high crimes” cannot serve as jurors); Arterburn v. State , 111 Nev. 1121, 1124 n.1, 901 P.2d 668, 670 n.1 (1995) (recognizing that Nevada’s statutes limit a felon’s rights, including the right to carry a firearm and the right to obtain certain professional licenses); see NRS 213.155 (restoring civil rights to convicted criminals after parole). [34] NRS 241.020(1). [35] While prisoners should be afforded the tools to “attack their sentences” and “challenge the conditions of their confinement,” “[i]mpairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental (and perfectly constitutional) consequences of conviction and incarceration.” Lewis v. Casey , 518 U.S. 343, 355 (1996). The impairment of Stockmeier’s rights under the open meeting law is an incidental consequence of incarceration. [36] NRS 241.033(1). [37] Stockmeier’s hearing was in December 2002. In 2005, the Legislature amended the statute to require notice that includes “[a] list of the general top

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