ing was not a quasi-judicial proceeding Quasi-judicial proceedings are those proceedings having a judicial character that are performed by administrative agencies.[8] This court has held that an administrative body acts in a quasi-judicial manner when it refers to a proceeding as a trial, takes evidence, weighs evidence, and makes findings of fact and conclusions of law.[9] We have also held that “the taking of evidence only upon oath or affirmation, the calling and examining of witnesses on any relevant matter, impeachment of any witness, and the opportunity to rebut evidence presented against the employee” was “consistent with quasi-judicial administrative proceedings.”[10] Each administrative tribunal in these cases “act[ed] in a quasi-judicial capacity [because] it afford[ed] the parties substantially the same rights as those available in a court of law, such as the opportunity to present evidence, to assert legal claims and defenses, and to appeal from an adverse decision.”[11] Other courts have also required similar protections for an administrative proceeding to be deemed quasi-judicial. In Arizona, the procedures followed by the Board of Tax Appeals included “hearing the parties in open forum, taking the matter under advisement, deliberating, writing a written decision, and making that decision available to the parties and to the public.”[12] The Arizona Supreme Court concluded that these procedures created a judicial proceeding that fell within an open meeting law statute exception identical to NRS 241.030(3)(a).[13] Similarly, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit has defined a quasi-judicial proceeding as one that provides the following safeguards: (1) representation by counsel, (2) pretrial discovery, (3) the opportunity to present memoranda of law, (4) examinations and cross-examinations at the hearing, (5) the opportunity to introduce exhibits, (6) the chance to object to evidence at the hearing, and (7) final findings of fact and conclusions of law.[14] Under its own open meeting law, Vermont has also defined a quasi-judicial proceeding as a case in which the legal rights of one or more persons who are granted party status are adjudicated, which is conducted in such a way that all parties have opportunity to present evidence and to cross-examine witnesses presented by other parties, which results in a written decision, and the result of which is appealable by a party to a higher authority.[15] These definitions center on the basic protections that litigants receive from a trial. To achieve a fair result, each party is allowed to present evidence supporting his side of the story and has the ability to challenge the other party’s witnesses to reveal discrepancies in their testimony. A written decision allows the parties to see why the public body ruled the way it did, and the public body is held accountable through the ability to appeal. Without these basic adversarial procedures, a proceeding could be unfair and unreliable. This is exactly what the open meeting law was enacted to prevent. The Legislature enacted the open meeting law “to aid in the conduct of the people’s business. It is the intent of the law that [public bodies’] actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.”[16] Thus, the Legislature has required that meetings of public bodies be thrown open to the public so that the persons making the decisions can be held accountable. The very purpose of the open meeting law would be circumvented if public bodies were allowed to avoid the open meeting law by claiming that a proceeding was a judicial proceeding without providing the basic protections of a trial. At a minimum, a quasi-judicial proceeding must afford each party (1) the ability to present and object to evidence, (2) the ability to cross-examine witnesses, (3) a written decision from the public body, and (4) an opportunity to appeal to a higher authority. In this case, the Psych Panel’s actions were not quasi-judicial proceedings. The Psych Panel acted to “certif[y] that the prisoner was under observation while confined in an institution of the Department of Corrections and does not represent a high risk to reoffend based upon a currently accepted standard of assessment.”[17] The certification involved holding a hearing to receive input from the Department of Corrections, the prisoner’s victims, the public, and the prisoner; questioning the prisoner; and then deliberating and rendering a decision on whether the prisoner represents a high risk to reoffend. At no time was Stockmeier able to cross-examine the witnesses or call witnesses on his own behalf. The Psych Panel does not issue a detailed, written decision,[18] and the prisoner cannot appeal the Psych Panel’s decision. Therefore, we conclude that the Psych Panel hearing is not exempt under the judicial proceeding exception and is subject to the open meeting law. Consequently, we must next address whether Stockmeier may assert violations of the open meeting law against the Psych Panel. The first inquiry is whether Stockmeier has standing to enforce the open meeting law. Standing to assert open meeting law violations The district court determined that Stockmeier lacked standing to assert violations of the open meeting law. It based its holding on the constitutional standing requirements of injury, causation, and redressability as set forth in Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife .[19] However, as those standing requirements arise from the “case or controversy” requirement of the United States Constitution, they do not necessarily provide the standing threshold for Nevada courts. We disagree that Stockmeier must satisfy federal constitutional standing to assert violations of the open meeting law.[20] The United States Supreme Court explained that Lujan ’s standing requirements protect the limited jurisdiction of the federal courts arising under the “case or controversy” requirements of Article III of the United States Constitution.[21] Under the “case or controversy” requirement, the federal judiciary cannot declare the rights of individuals or “determine the constitutionality of legislative or executive acts” without an “actual controversy” between the parties.[22] However, state courts are not required to comply with the federal “case or controversy” requirement. “[S]tanding is a self-imposed rule of restraint. State courts need not become enmeshed in the federal complexities and technicalities involving standing and are free to reject procedural frustrations in favor of just and expeditious determination on the ultimate merits.”[23] State courts are free to adopt a “case or controversy” justiciability requirement or open their courts to lawsuits that may not meet this requirement.[24] This court has a “long history of requiring an actual justiciable controversy as a predicate to judicial relief.”[25] In cases for declaratory relief[26] and where constitutional matters arise,[27] this court has required plaintiffs to meet increased jurisdictional standing requirements. However, where the Legislature has provided the people of Nevada with certain statutory rights, we have not required constitutional standing to assert such rights but instead have examined the language of the statute itself to determine whether the plaintiff had standing to sue.[28] To do otherwise would be to bar the people of Nevada from seeking recourse in state courts whenever the Legislature has provided statutory rights that are broader than constitutional standing would allow. In the present case, NRS 241.037(2) provides that “[a]ny person denied a right conferred by [NRS Chapter 241] may sue.” The Legislature has indicated in the statute who has standing to sue. Therefore, we conclude that constitutional standing under Lujan is not applicable to a person asserting injury under the open meeting law, and the correct inquiry to determine whether Stockmeier has standing to sue is whether h

Vegas Law