. The State concedes. Accordingly, we vacate Nolan’s conviction for battery with the use of a deadly weapon with substantial bodily harm. Improper jury instructions in both trials Nolan alleges that the district court failed to give a proper jury instruction in either trial for the kidnapping charge. Specifically, Nolan contends the instruction was misleading and confused the jury regarding the movement of the victim that must occur to support a conviction of both sexual assault and kidnapping. “The district court has broad discretion to settle jury instructions, and this court reviews the district court’s decision for an abuse of that discretion or judicial error.”[18] “‘An abuse of discretion occurs if the district court’s decision is arbitrary or capricious or if it exceeds the bounds of law or reason.’”[19] We perceive no abuse of discretion or judicial error. Nolan specifically focuses on the possibility that because of the movement required to commit a sexual assault, every sexual assault would also include a kidnapping. However, this concern fails to recognize that the district court gave an additional instruction requiring the jury to find beyond a reasonable doubt either: (1) that the movement of the victim was not incidental to the sexual assault and that the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and above that necessarily present in the sexual assault; or (2) that the victim was restrained and such restraint increased the risk of harm to the victim. Thus, the requirements necessary to find Nolan guilty of both kidnapping and sexual assault were provided in the district court’s instructions. We recently approved such an instruction for dual criminality.[20] Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in giving the instructions for kidnapping. Sufficiency of the evidence in both trials Nolan also contends that once all of the improper evidence is stricken, there is insufficient evidence to sustain his convictions. This contention is without merit. “The standard of review [when analyzing the sufficiency of evidence] in a criminal case is ‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.’”[21] Additionally, “it is the jury’s function, not that of the court, to assess the weight of the evidence and determine the credibility of witnesses.”[22] After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of Nolan’s crimes against Weishaar beyond a reasonable doubt. Bartenders testified that they saw Nolan and Weishaar together the evening of the alleged crime and that they left the bar around the same time. Weishaar was found by an off-duty EMT, after she suffered extensive injuries, including a vaginal laceration, anal bruising, substantial blood loss, and facial bruising. Weishaar also explained to a detective what occurred to her that night. While at the hospital, Weishaar realized her ATM card was missing, and Nolan was found using her card to purchase several pairs of shoes. Nolan admitted to having sexual relations with Weishaar but denied sexually assaulting her. Although Nolan argued that another individual assaulted Weishaar, the evidence points to Nolan. From that evidence, a jury could have found the essential elements of the crimes committed against Weishaar beyond a reasonable doubt. Likewise, after reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution, a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of Nolan’s crimes against Dyson and her son beyond a reasonable doubt. First, Dyson testified as to all the events that occurred with Nolan.[23] While no physical indications of forced sexual penetration were found, the examining nurse stated trauma is not always present and Dyson’s blood was found in Nolan’s apartment. Second, Dyson’s son engaged in an altercation with Nolan after throwing rocks at his window, Dyson and her daughter testified that Nolan used a rock to hit her son in the head, and Dyson’s son suffered a broken nose and head injuries requiring staples. Viewed in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the jury could have found the essential elements of the crimes committed against Dyson and her son beyond a reasonable doubt. Although conflicting testimony was given, the jury has the prerogative of weighing the credibility of the witnesses. In this case, the jury rejected Nolan’s version of events, and we will not disturb the jury’s determination that the witnesses against Nolan were more credible. CONCLUSION We affirm Nolan’s convictions in the first trial for first-degree kidnapping, sexual assault, sexual assault with substantial bodily harm, robbery, burglary, unauthorized signing of a credit or debit transaction, and attempted unauthorized signing of a credit or debit transaction. Further, we affirm Nolan’s convictions for first-degree kidnapping, sexual assault, and attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon in the second trial, but we reverse Nolan’s conviction for battery with the use of a deadly weapon with substantial bodily harm. We therefore remand this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this opinion. MAUPIN and GIBBONS, JJ., concur. **********FOOTNOTES********** [1] Petrocelli v. State , 101 Nev. 46, 52, 692 P.2d 503, 508 (1985) (quoting Brown v. State , 81 Nev. 397, 400, 404 P.2d 428, 430 (1965)). [2] State v. Jepsen , 46 Nev. 193, 196, 209 P. 501, 502 (1922). [3] People v. Shirley , 723 P.2d 1354, 1385 (Cal. 1982). [4] Id. at 1385. [5] This is further evidenced by the testimony of individuals who aided Weishaar on the night in question. The woman who first found her stated Weishaar could not remember her name. The treating nurse said Weishaar’s details of the crime were “sketchy,” and the treating physician noted she did not have any recollection of the assault. [6] Chapman v. California , 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967). [7] See id. [8] Crawford v. Washington , 541 U.S. 36, 68 (2004). [9] Id. [10] Rippo v. State , 113 Nev. 1239, 1259, 946 P.2d 1017, 1030 (1997) (stating that failure to object during trial precludes appellate review of the issue). [11] Gallego v. State , 117 Nev. 348, 365, 23 P.3d 227, 239 (2001); NRS 178.602. [12] Gallego , 117 Nev. at 365, 23 P.3d at 239. [13] 120 Nev. 410, 416, 92 P.3d 1246, 1251 (2004). [14] Id. at 417, 92 P.3d at 1251. [15] Daniels v. State , 114 Nev. 261, 267, 956 P.2d 111, 115 (1998). [16] Id. [17] Id. [18] Crawford v. State , 121 Nev. ____, ____, 121 P.3d 582, 585 (2005). [19] Id. (quoting Jackson v. State , 117 Nev. 116, 120, 17 P.3d 998, 1000 (2001)). [20] Mendoza v. State , 122 Nev. ___, ___ P.3d ___ (Adv. Op. No. 23, March 16, 2006). [21] McNair v. State , 108 Nev. 53, 56, 825 P.2d 571, 573 (1992) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia , 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). [22] Id. [23] Gaxiola v. State , 121 Nev. ___, ___ 119 P.3d 1225, 1232 (2005) (“This court has repeatedly stated that the uncorroborated testimony of a victim, without more, is sufficient to uphold a rape conviction.”). ***************************** 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 35 April 27, 2006 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA No. 41529 ROBERT LESLIE STOCKMEIER, Appellant, vs. NEVADA DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW PANEL, Respondent. Proper person appeal from a district court order granting a motion to dismiss. Sixth Judicial District Court, Pershing County; Richard Wagner, Judge. Reversed and remanded. Robert Leslie Stockmeier, Lovelock, in Proper

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