ly to prove that very status—was minimal at best, and was substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Consequently, we conclude that the district court abused its discretion in rejecting Edwards' proffered stipulation and in permitting the State to admit the actual records of Edwards' prior convictions.[19] Evidence of corpus delicti Other than the fact of his prior convictions, the State's evidence against Edwards at trial consisted entirely of his admission to a police officer that he moved the gun several feet. It has long been black letter law in Nevada that the corpus delicti of a crime must be proven independently of the defendant's extrajudicial admissions.[20] Although Edwards has not raised the issue is this appeal, we conclude that his conviction based solely upon his extrajudicial admission constitutes plain, clear error affecting his substantial rights. As such, the error warrants reversal on this separate and independent ground.[21] CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, we reverse Edwards' conviction, and we remand this matter to the district court with instructions to vacate the conviction. **********FOOTNOTES********** [1] 519 U.S. 172 (1997). [2] 96 Nev. 341, 609 P.2d 324 (1980). [3] Id. at 342, 609 P.2d at 325. [4] Id. [5] Id . at 343, 609 P.2d at 326 (quoting People v. Morrison , 136 Cal. Rptr. 650, 652 (Ct. App. 1977) (quoting People v. Robles , 466 P.2d 710, 715 (Cal. 1970))). [6] Id. [7] Id. [8] 519 U.S. at 191-92. [9] Id. at 174. [10] Id. at 175. [11] Rule 403 provides: "Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." [12] 519 U.S. at 191. [13] Id. [14] See Sanders , 96 Nev. at 344, 609 P.2d at 326. [15] See NRS 48.045(2). [16] See Taylor v. State , 109 Nev. 849, 854, 858 P.2d 843, 846 (1993) (holding that the State may not admit character evidence to rebut a defense that the accused has not yet raised). [17] See NRS 50.095. [18] Compare NRS 202.360(1)(a), with 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). See also Old Chief , 519 U.S. at 190. [19] We are unable to conclude that the district court's error was harmless. See Sanders , 96 Nev. at 344, 609 P.2d at 326; Richmond v. State , 118 Nev. 924, 934, 59 P.3d 1249, 1255 (2002) (providing that failure to exclude evidence is harmless when evidence of guilt is overwhelming). [20] Doyle v. State , 112 Nev. 879, 892, 921 P.2d 901, 910 (1996) (citing Hooker v. Sheriff , 89 Nev. 89, 506 P.2d 1262 (1973)), overruled on other grounds by Kaczmarek v. State , 120 Nev. 314, 91 P.3d 16 (2004). [21] See Green v. State , 119 Nev. 542, 545, 80 P.3d 93, 95 (2003) (defining "plain" error). ***************************** 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 33 April 20, 2006 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA No. 43131 RICKY NOLAN, Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Appeal from judgments of conviction pursuant to jury verdicts in two separate trials. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Sally L. Loehrer, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded. Goodman Law Firm and Ross C. Goodman, Las Vegas, for Appellant. George Chanos, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger, District Attorney, and James Tufteland, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent. BEFORE MAUPIN, GIBBONS and HARDESTY, JJ. OPINION By the Court, HARDESTY, J.: In this appeal, we consider whether the district court may admit posthypnotic testimony that the witness claims is independent of the hypnotic session. The admissibility of posthypnotic testimony is subject to the procedural safeguards outlined in NRS 48.039(1) if the hypnotic session involved the subject matter of the testimony. We conclude that unverified information provided by posthypnotic testimony is inadmissible under NRS 48.039(2) because a person previously hypnotized to improve his or her recollection cannot reliably determine whether the unverified information is his or her own memory or induced by the hypnotic experience. The district court tried Nolan in two separate trials resulting in judgments of conviction in the first trial for first-degree kidnapping, sexual assault, sexual assault with substantial bodily harm, robbery, burglary, unauthorized signing of a credit or debit transaction, and attempted unauthorized signing of a credit or debit transaction; and in the second trial for first-degree kidnapping, sexual assault, attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, and battery with the use of a deadly weapon with substantial bodily harm. In this case, we conclude that the district court erred in the admission of posthypnotic testimony because the procedural requirements of NRS 48.039 were not met and the testimony was unreliable. However, because we conclude that the error was harmless and that appellant’s remaining assignments of error lack merit, we affirm the convictions for first-degree kidnapping, sexual assault, sexual assault with substantial bodily harm, robbery, burglary, unauthorized signing of a credit or debit transaction, attempted unauthorized signing of a credit or debit transaction, and attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon. Further, since the State concedes that the doctrine of merger precludes a conviction for both battery with the use of a deadly weapon and attempted murder with the use of a deadly weapon, we reverse the conviction for battery with the use of a deadly weapon. FACTS Appellant Ricky Nolan was charged with 24 counts of various crimes arising from interactions with two women on separate occasions. The district court granted Nolan’s motion to sever the counts into two trials. At the first trial, Nolan was tried on multiple counts arising from his alleged sexual assault of victim Lynda Weishaar and his subsequent unauthorized use of her credit card. Trial testimony indicated that in October 2002, Weishaar and Nolan arrived separately at a local pub where they engaged in conversation. Weishaar, who had taken an antidepressant and a painkiller earlier that day, drank alcohol for several hours at the bar. Although they left the pub around the same time, they were not seen leaving together. Thereafter, Weishaar was sexually assaulted in a Las Vegas apartment complex. After the assault, Weishaar was found on a street near the exit of the apartment complex. The woman who found her testified Weishaar could not remember her own name. The treating nurse at the hospital stated that Weishaar’s memory was limited and “sketchy,” and that Weishaar did not know what had happened to her. The treating physician testified that Weishaar had no recollection of the events that had occurred. Moreover, Weishaar told the investigating detective that the events of the night were like a “fuzzy dream” and everything was a “blur.” Prior to the preliminary hearing, Weishaar underwent hypnosis to assist her recall of the events. But Weishaar testified at the preliminary hearing that she had little recollection of the sexual assault. However, at trial, she was permitted to testify in more detail about the assault because she claimed she had some memories independent of the hypnotic session. The district court limited Weishaar’s testimony to those memories that she maintained she recalled before undergoing hypnosis. Weishaar testified she had two clear memories of the assault before she underwent hypnosis; the first was lying on a soft mattress while having Nolan over her and forcing her to have intercourse, and the second was lying on her stomach while being sodomize

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