0 P.3d 978, 980 (2004) (where activity fell under an unambiguous sexual molestation exclusion of a homeowner’s insurance policy, the insurer was not obligated to defend or indemnify the insured); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Neal , 119 Nev. 62, 65, 64 P.3d 472, 473 (2003) (unambiguous clause excluding uninsured motorist coverage above the statutory minimum was enforceable); Dwello v. American Reliance Insurance Co. , 115 Nev. 422, 424-25, 990 P.2d 190, 191-92 (1999) (a loss occurring during babysitting fell under an unambiguous business pursuits exclusion in a homeowner’s policy, and the insurance company was not required to defend or indemnify the insured); Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Young , 108 Nev. 328, 332-33, 832 P.2d 376, 378-79 (1992) (automobile insurance exclusion limiting liability coverage for nonpermissive users was unambiguous and enforceable). These cases do not involve aviation insurance policies and are simply illustrative of instances where this court upheld unambiguous insurance exclusions without regard to causal connection. [17] See , e.g. , Hollywood Flying Service v. Compass Ins. Co. , 597 F.2d 507, 508-09 (5th Cir. 1979); Grigsby v. Houston Fire & Casualty Insurance Co. , 148 S.E.2d 925, 927 (Ga. Ct. App. 1966); U.S. Fire Ins. v. W. Monroe Charter Service , 504 So. 2d 93, 99-100 (La. Ct. App. 1987); Security Mut. Cas. Co. v. O’Brien , 662 P.2d 639, 640-41 (N.M. 1983); Avemco Ins. Co. v. White , 841 P.2d 588, 590 (Okla. 1992). [18] Security Ins. Co. v. Andersen , 763 P.2d 246, 249 (Ariz. 1988). [19] Id. at 250. [20] Lightenburger v. Gordon , 81 Nev. 553, 577, 407 P.2d 728, 741 (1965), overruled on other grounds by Motenko v. MGM Dist., Inc. , 112 Nev. 1038, 921 P.2d 933 (1996). [21] See , e.g. , Puckett v. U.S. Fire Ins. Co. , 678 S.W.2d 936, 937-38 (Tex. 1984). [22] Vitale , 116 Nev. at 594, 5 P.3d at 1057. [23] See Andersen , 763 P.2d at 249. [24] We note that the record indicates that Jensen was aware of the exclusion and he was familiar with the federal aviation regulations that required the annual inspection. Jensen also knew that the regulations forbade the operation of his plane if it had not received an annual inspection within the preceding twelve months. [25] See NRS 687B.110(2). [26] Griffin contends that Nevada disfavors the preclusion of recovery for technical noncompliance with unambiguous exclusions and cites to Davenport v. Republic Insurance Co. , 97 Nev. 152, 154, 625 P.2d 574, 575 (1981). Davenport , however, involved an insured who failed to file a sworn proof of loss form but who notified the insurer of the loss by phone immediately after it occurred. Davenport did not address causality, and failure to file the proof of loss form is far removed from failing to obtain federally mandated aircraft safety inspections. Therefore, Davenport does not apply to our analysis. [27] Andersen , 763 P.2d at 251. [28] See id. ; see also O’Brien , 662 P.2d at 640-41. [29] See NRS 687B.320(1). [30] We note that the requirements set forth in NRS 687B.320 are not so different from the public policy requirements set forth in this opinion for aviation exclusions. An exclusion must be unambiguous, narrowly tailored, and essential to the risk undertaken by the insurer. Implied in these requirements is that the insured must have some actual or presumptive notice of the excluded activities in order for the insurer to be able to avoid liability. Here, Jensen testified that he was aware of the airworthiness requirements, that he had received training regarding certain airworthiness requirements, and that he had also initialed a clause in the insurance application that indicated that there would be no coverage unless an airworthiness certificate was in full force and effect. Nonetheless, we note that efforts by insurers to conceal or enshroud unambiguous exclusions by burying them in lengthy insurance policy contracts will not be tolerated, and we would look less favorably upon an unambiguous exclusion without adequate notice to the insured. ***************************** Home - Search - Contact Us - Scheduled Meetings - Nevada Supreme Court Advance Opinions search document view for Edwards v. State 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 34 (2006) First hit Next document Previous document Native HTML View image Back to results New search Cite as: Edwards v. State 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 34 April 27, 2006 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA No. 42518 JOHNNY HOWARD EDWARDS, JR., Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, Respondent. Appeal from a judgment of conviction, pursuant to a jury verdict, of one count of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Jackie Glass, Judge. Reversed and remanded . Philip J. Kohn, Public Defender, and Kevin V. Williams, Deputy Public Defender, Clark County, for Appellant. George Chanos, Attorney General, Carson City; David J. Roger, District Attorney, and James Tufteland, Chief Deputy District Attorney, Clark County, for Respondent. BEFORE MAUPIN, DOUGLAS and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ. OPINION PER CURIAM: Appellant Johnny Howard Edwards, Jr., appeals his judgment of conviction, upon a jury verdict, of one count of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. He contends that because he offered to stipulate to his ex-felon status, the district court erred in denying his motion to exclude the records of his prior felony convictions offered by the State to demonstrate his ex-felon status. We agree. In accord with the United States Supreme Court decision in Old Chief v. United States ,[1] we hold that, in a prosecution for possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, if the accused offers to stipulate that he has been convicted of a prior felony or felonies, the admission of the prior convictions is unduly prejudicial when its sole purpose is to prove ex-felon status. We further conclude that the State's failure to prove the corpus delicti of the crime with evidence independent of Edwards' own extrajudicial admissions constitutes plain error warranting reversal. Accordingly, we reverse and remand to the district court with instructions to vacate Edwards' judgment of conviction. FACTS On December 22, 2002, Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Officers Mark Harding and Gabriel Lebario investigated a complaint of suspected drug activity at the apartment of Latoya Adams. Several people, including appellant Edwards, were present in the apartment when the officers arrived. Adams informed Officer Harding that she was in possession of marijuana for her personal use and granted the officers permission to confiscate it. While Officer Lebario followed Adams into the bedroom to retrieve the marijuana, Officer Harding ran a background check on the other individuals in the apartment and discovered that Edwards was an ex-felon. As Adams removed a box containing the marijuana from her closet, she exposed a silver handgun. She informed Officer Lebario that the gun belonged to her brother, who had given it to her for protection because she lived in a high-crime neighborhood. When questioned, Edwards offered the same explanation but admitted that he had moved the gun from the top shelf of the closet to the bottom shelf in order to conceal it when he heard the police arrive. Edwards acknowledged that as an ex-felon, he was not supposed to be around firearms. The State indicted Edwards on one count of possession of a firearm by an ex-felon. Prior to trial, Edwards' counsel offered to stipulate to his status as an ex-felon to prevent the State from introducing his prior felony convictions for attempted bribery or intimidation of a witness, attempted possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, possession of a firearm by an ex-felon, and possession of a controlled substance. The prosecutor refused to enter into the stipulation, explaining in part: [F]actually, what we have here is I

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