arties intentionally limited such obligations.”[12] Consequently, we will not imply a causality requirement in Old Republic’s airworthiness exclusion when no causal connection language is present. Unlike McDaniel , in Randono v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Group we held that an insurer’s refusal to pay death benefits to the insured’s widow was justified because the insured misrepresented that he did not have high blood pressure on his life insurance application.[13] High blood pressure did not cause the insured’s death because the insured died of stomach cancer.[14] Nonetheless, we held that the life insurance premiums would have been much higher if the insured had reported his hypertension and that any misrepresentation that was material “‘to the hazard assumed by the insurer’” allowed the insurer to refuse coverage despite the absence of a causal connection.[15] Similar Nevada cases have not required insurers to show a causal connection between the exclusion and the loss in order to avoid liability under an unambiguous insurance exclusion.[16] Additionally, a majority of jurisdictions that have considered causality have held that insurers may avoid liability under a policy exclusion, even when the insured’s noncompliance with the exclusion does not cause the loss, so long as the exclusion is unambiguous.[17] The Supreme Court of Arizona, for instance, has held that where an exclusion is narrow and specifically delineates what is and is not covered and “where the relevant clause is an exclusion of coverage” and not a condition subsequent, and where the exclusion is “completely unambiguous,” then “no causal connection need be proved” in order for the insurer to avoid liability.[18] Further, the court reasoned that “public policy favors a rule that encourages owners and operators of aircraft to obey and satisfy safety regulations.”[19] With regard to aircraft safety regulations, NRS 493.150 provides that “[i]t shall be unlawful for any person to operate or cause or authorize to be operated any civil aircraft within this State unless such aircraft has an appropriate effective certificate, permit or license issued by the United States.” This court has also held that federal aviation regulations are a legitimate means of insuring safe flight and that federal aviation regulations “are designed to promote safe conduct of air traffic.”[20] We agree that aircraft safety is enhanced when policy exclusions relating to safety are upheld, regardless of causal connection. Although the minority approach requires a causal connection,[21] we now join the majority and hold that insurers may avoid liability under safety-related exclusions in aviation insurance policies, even when the insured’s noncompliance with the exclusion is not causally related to the loss, so long as the exclusion is unambiguous, narrowly tailored, and essential to the risk undertaken by the insurer. An exclusion is narrowly tailored if it “clearly and distinctly communicates to the insured the nature of the limitation,”[22] and specifically delineates what is and is not covered.[23] Here, the exclusion clearly states that there is no coverage when “the Airworthiness Certificate of the aircraft is not in full force and effect” or when “the aircraft has not been subjected to the appropriate airworthiness inspection(s) as required under current applicable Federal Air Regulations for the operations involved.” This language clearly communicates that Jensen’s aircraft would not be covered unless a standard airworthiness certificate was in full force and effect.[24] Therefore, the exclusion is narrowly tailored because it clearly and distinctly communicates the nature of the limitation and delineates that Jensen’s plane would not be covered without a valid airworthiness certificate. An exclusion is essential to the risk undertaken by the insurer if the clause excludes activities that are material to the acceptance of the risk, or are material to the hazard assumed by the insurer.[25] Federal aviation regulations specifically require aircraft owners and operators to obtain airworthiness certificates in order to operate their aircraft, and airworthiness certificates require owners and operators to ensure that their aircraft undergo regular maintenance and annual inspections by certified mechanics. Presumably, an insurer would charge a much higher premium, or refuse to insure an aircraft altogether, if the aircraft was not subjected to regular maintenance and annual inspections as required by federal aviation regulations. The failure to have an annual inspection and to have an airworthiness certificate is material to the hazard assumed by the insurer. Therefore, an airworthiness certificate is essential to the risk undertaken by an insurer. As the airworthiness exclusion at issue in this case is narrowly tailored and essential to the risk undertaken by the insurer, it applies to exclude coverage.[26] Failure to notify As a final matter, Griffin argues that Old Republic was required to ensure that Jensen complied with the unambiguous exclusion and that Old Republic’s failure to notify Jensen of his noncompliance constitutes a waiver of the exclusion pursuant to NRS 687B.320. NRS 687B.320 describes when and how an insurer may cancel an insurance policy before the policy’s expiration; it requires the insurer to give adequate notice of cancellation, and necessitates a triggering event in order for the insurer to be able to cancel the insurance policy. Examples of triggering events include failure to pay insurance premiums, fraud, and conviction of a crime increasing the insured’s risk. However, the question before the court is not one of policy cancellation but one of policy exclusion. Other jurisdictions have distinguished policy exclusions from policy cancellation. An exclusionary provision excludes coverage for certain activities from the outset of the insurance contract[27] and preemptively excludes certain conduct from coverage in an effort to minimize risk.[28] Conversely, a cancellation normally occurs as a result of, and as a condition subsequent to, an event that violates the insurance policy.[29] We have consistently held that parties may freely contract, and an insurer may lawfully exclude risks from coverage under its policy. We distinguish exclusions from cancellations, and therefore, NRS 687B.320 does not apply to policy exclusions.[30] CONCLUSION We answer the certified question in the affirmative, holding that insurers need not establish a causal connection between a safety-related aviation policy exclusion and the loss in order to exclude coverage so long as the exclusion is unambiguous, narrowly tailored, and essential to the risk undertaken by the insurer. ROSE, C.J., BECKER, MAUPIN, GIBBONS, HARDESTY and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur. **********FOOTNOTES********** [1] Vitale v. Jefferson Ins. Co. , 116 Nev. 590, 594, 5 P.3d 1054, 1057 (2000). [2] Id. [3] Id. ; see also Clark v. Truck Ins. Exchange , 95 Nev. 544, 546, 598 P.2d 628, 629 (1979). [4] Canfora v. Coast Hotels & Casinos, Inc. , 121 Nev. ___, ___, 121 P.3d 599, 603 (2005). [5] See generally Continental Ins. Co. v. Murphy , 120 Nev. 506, 96 P.3d 747 (2004). [6] 118 Nev. 596, 600, 53 P.3d 904, 906 (2002). [7] Id. at 597, 53 P.3d at 905. [8] Id. at 598, 53 P.3d at 906-07. [9] Id. at 600, 53 P.3d at 907. [10] Id. at 601, 53 P.3d at 908. [11] Senteney v. Fire Ins. Exchange , 101 Nev. 654, 656, 707 P.2d 1149, 1150 (1985). [12] Id. [13] 106 Nev. 371, 375, 793 P.2d 1324, 1326-27 (1990). [14] Id. at 372, 793 P.2d at 1324-25. [15] Id. at 375-76, 793 P.2d at 1326-27 (quoting NRS 687B.110). NRS 687B.110 prevents loss of coverage due to an insured’s nonmaterial misrepresentations in an insurance application. [16] See Fire Ins. Exch. v. Cornell , 120 Nev. 303, 306-07, 9

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