zona law.[39] Section 6(2)(g) Lastly, section 6(2)(g) recommends that the courts consider the “ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.” The analysis so far produces an outcome resulting in two separate state laws being applied to a single trial. But in this case, both states’ laws can be accommodated by jury instructions that explain the law applicable to each defendant with respect to Simmons’ claims and any potential comparative fault defenses to those claims. Additionally, the district court can utilize special verdict forms to guide the jury in making its determination. Thus, this consideration does not counsel against instructing the jury on two separate state laws. We conclude, therefore, that Arizona law applies to the causes of action alleged against Chapman Auto because Arizona has a more significant relationship to the claims for relief, Simmons, and Chapman Auto than Nevada.[40] CONCLUSION We now hold that in Nevada, section 145 of the Second Restatement governs choice-of-law issues in tort actions unless the Second Restatement contains a section that specifically addresses a particular tort. Because section 146 governs choice-of-law issues in personal injury claims, we apply the most significant relationship test set forth in section 146 to this case. Applying section 146, we deny the petition as to GM because, as a legal matter, the car accident and GM have no relationship with Arizona. Consequently, Nevada law applies to Simmons’ claims for relief asserted against GM. However, we grant the petition as to Chapman Auto because Arizona has a more significant relationship to Simmons, Chapman Auto, and the sale of the vehicle. Consequently, Arizona law applies to Simmons’ claims for relief asserted against Chapman Auto. We deny the petition with respect to the district court’s refusal to dismiss the underlying action on forum non conveniens grounds. Accordingly, we direct the clerk of this court to issue a writ of mandamus directing the district court to apply Arizona law to Simmons’ claims for relief against Chapman Auto. ROSE, C.J., BECKER, GIBBONS, DOUGLAS and PARRAGUIRRE, JJ., concur. **********FOOTNOTES********** [1] 112 Nev. 1038, 1039, 921 P.2d 933, 934 (1996) (plurality opinion). [2] Hickey v. District Court , 105 Nev. 729, 731, 782 P.2d 1336, 1338 (1989). [3] DR Partners v. Bd. of County Comm’rs , 116 Nev. 616, 620, 6 P.3d 465, 468 (2000). [4] State, Div. Child & Fam. Servs. v. Dist. Ct. , 120 Nev. 445, 449, 92 P.3d 1239, 1242 (2004). [5] NRS 34.170. [6] Cheung v. Dist. Ct. , 121 Nev. ____, ____, 124 P.3d 550, 552 (2005). [7] We deny that part of the petition challenging the district court’s refusal to dismiss for forum non conveniens. Smith v. District Court , 113 Nev. 1343, 1344-45, 950 P.2d 280, 281 (1997) (concluding that this court will not exercise its discretion to consider writ petitions that challenge district court orders denying motions to dismiss, except when the court is clearly compelled to dismiss the action under a rule or statute or when an important issue of law requires clarification). [8] Motenko , 112 Nev. at 1039, 921 P.2d at 934 (plurality opinion). [9] Id. at 1039-40, 921 P.2d at 934. [10] Id. at 1040, 921 P.2d at 934. [11] Id. [12] Id. at 1039, 921 P.2d at 934. [13] Id. [14] Id. [15] Id. [16] Id. at 1041-42, 921 P.2d at 935-36. [17] See generally 112 Nev. 1038, 921 P.2d 933. The five-justice court came to three differing conclusions. First, two of the justices affirmed the district court’s order but did so under a modified version of the most significant relationship test. This modified version is the “overwhelming interest” test. Second, the concurring justice agreed to affirm the district court’s order but argued that the court should do so under the vested rights approach. Third, the two dissenting justices recommended that the court adopt the most significant relationship test in the Second Restatement without modification. [18] Id. at 1041, 921 P.2d at 935. [19] Id. at 1041-42, 921 P.2d at 935. These factors were borrowed, with some modification, from the factors set forth in section 145(2) of the Second Restatement. [20] Id. [21] Id. at 1041-42, 921 P.2d at 935. [22] Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145(2) states as follows: (2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the law applicable to an issue include: (a) the place where the injury occurred, (b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred, (c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties, and (d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered. [23] Motenko , 112 Nev. at 1041-42, 921 P.2d at 935 (plurality opinion). [24] Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 (1971) (stating that “[t]he rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the principles stated in § 6 ” (emphasis added)). [25] 112 Nev. at 1042, 921 P.2d at 935 (plurality opinion). [26] 118 Nev. 133, 42 P.3d 244 (2002). [27] Id. at 134-35, 42 P.3d at 245 (plurality opinion). [28] Id. at 135-36, 42 P.3d at 245-46; id. at 136, 42 P.3d at 246 (Maupin, C.J., concurring and dissenting); id. at 140, 42 P.3d at 248-49 (Agosti, J., dissenting) (applying Second Restatement approach). [29] Id. at 135-36, 42 P.3d at 245-46 (plurality opinion). [30] Id. at 139, 42 P.3d at 248 (Agosti, J., dissenting) (stating that “‘[i]n a rapidly developing area, such as choice of law, it is often more important that good rules be developed than that predictability and uniformity of result should be assured through continued adherence to existing rules’” (quoting Restatement (Second) Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. i (1971))). [31] Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 6 cmt. c (1971). [32] 118 Nev. at 138, 42 P.3d at 247 (Agosti, J., dissenting); see also Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 cmt. a (1971). [33] William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Understanding Conflict of Laws § 68, 200 (3d ed. 2002) (stating that the vested rights “rules are almost entirely (and deliberately) blind to the content of and the policies behind the competing internal laws” of each state). [34] 112 Nev. at 1048, 921 P.2d at 939 (Steffen, C.J., dissenting). [35] Section 6(2)(a), (b), and (e) have been considered and have no application to these particular facts. [36] Compare Jimenez v. Sears, Roebuck and Co. , 904 P.2d 861 (Ariz. 1995), with Jeep Corporation v. Murray , 101 Nev. 640, 645, 708 P.2d 297, 301 (1985), and Young’s Machine Co. v. Long , 100 Nev. 692, 692 P.2d 24 (1984). [37] Compare Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 12-2505, with NRS 41.141(1). [38] See, e.g. , Englert v. Canondelet Health Network , 13 P.3d 763 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2000); NRS 41.141(1) & (2). [39] We note that there appears to be a difference in the duty imposed under Arizona law from the duty imposed under Nevada law on the failure to inspect and warn claim. Compare Witt Ice & Gas Co. v. Bedway , 231 P.2d 952, 954 (Ariz. 1951) (stating that “‘[a]n imperative social duty requires a vendor of a mechanical device to take at least such easily available precautions as are reasonably likely to prevent serious injury to those who by using such a device may be exposed to dangers arising from its defective construction’” (quoting Ebbert v. Philadelphia Electric Co. , 198 A. 323, 327 (Pa. 1938)), with Long v. Flanigan Warehouse Co. , 79 Nev. 241, 249, 382 P.2d

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