subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice of law. (2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include (a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied. These principles are not intended to be exclusive and no one principle is weighed more heavily than another.[31] Importantly, section 145 is a general statement and will not apply to all tort actions. As the dissent in Northwest Pipe noted, the Second Restatement has developed other sections that specifically apply to certain torts.[32] Thus, the Second Restatement is designed to provide a particular framework depending on the nature of the tort. Section 146 of the Second Restatement governs personal injury claims The nature of the current claim is one for personal injury. Section 146 of the Second Restatement provides a particularized framework for analyzing choice-of-law issues in personal injury cases. Section 146 states that the rights and liabilities of the parties are governed by the “local law of the state where the injury occurred” unless “some other state has a more significant relationship” to the occurrence under the principles stated in section 6. The general rule in section 146 requires the court to apply the law of the state where the injury took place. We conclude that in order for the analysis to move past this general rule and into the section 6 principles, a party must present some evidence of a relationship between the nonforum state, the occurrence giving rise to the claims for relief, and the parties. If no evidence is presented, then the general rule of section 146 governs. However, if a party does present evidence of a relationship between the nonforum state, the occurrence giving rise to the claims for relief, and the parties, then the analysis moves to an evaluation of that evidence under the section 6 principles to determine which state has a more significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties. The section 6 factors inject flexibility into the choice-of-law analysis. Unlike the vested rights approach and the quantitative focus of the Motenko approach, an analysis of the section 6 factors considers the “content of and the policies behind the [forum and nonforum state’s] competing internal laws.”[33] This is the crux on which an informed decision rests its reasoning. The Motenko dissent recognized this principle, stating that “[a] qualitative evaluation under the most significant relationship doctrine promotes consideration of differing state policies and interests underlying the particular issue as factors for making the choice-of-law decision.”[34] Nevada law applies to Simmons’ causes of action against GM GM has failed to present any evidence demonstrating that Arizona has a relationship to the occurrence giving rise to Simmons’ claims for relief against GM. The car accident occurred in Nevada, and Nevada is the place of the injury. Additionally, GM is a Delaware corporation with its principal office located in Michigan. GM manufactured the 1996 Chevrolet Metro outside Arizona’s borders. While a GM car was sold in Arizona to an Arizona resident, Chapman Auto, which is located in Arizona, is not a dealer or in any other way affiliated with GM. Because Simmons’ claims for relief against GM are centered in Nevada where the accident occurred and Michigan where the car was manufactured, and GM has no relationship with Arizona, GM has failed to present any evidence to suggest that the general rule under section 146 should not apply. Thus, Nevada law applies to Simmons’ claims against GM because Nevada is the place where the injury occurred. Arizona law applies to Simmons’ causes of action against Chapman Auto Conversely, Chapman Auto has presented evidence demonstrating that Arizona has some relationship to the occurrence giving rise to Simmons’ claims against Chapman Auto. Chapman Auto is an independent auto dealer located in Arizona and Simmons is an Arizona resident. Chapman Auto sold the Chevrolet Metro to Simmons in Arizona. Simmons is suing Chapman Auto for injuries resulting from the failure of a roof assembly in a vehicle sold in Arizona. If Chapman Auto is found liable, the occurrence giving rise to liability will have occurred in Arizona. Thus, the inquiry moves beyond the general rule in section 146 and into an analysis under the section 6 principles to determine whether Arizona or Nevada has a more significant relationship to Simmons, Chapman Auto, and the sale of the vehicle.[35] Applying the section 6 principles, Arizona has a more significant relationship to Chapman Auto and Simmons than Nevada. Section 6(2)(c) Section 6(2)(c) states that “the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue” should be considered. Unlike Nevada, Arizona has made a policy choice to allow comparative fault defenses to strict liability claims where product misuse is asserted as a defense.[36] Here, there is an allegation that Simmons was driving in excess of the speed limit. If this allegation is proven true, then Arizona has an interest in seeing that its car dealers who operate solely in Arizona receive some protection in strict liability claims. Further, Arizona’s comparative fault defense to tort actions differs from Nevada’s.[37] Arizona permits recovery by a plaintiff who is found by a jury to be greater than 50% comparatively at fault, where Nevada does not.[38] In such a case, Arizona only reduces the recovery by the percentage of comparative fault. Therefore, Arizona has made a policy decision to provide some compensation to plaintiffs regardless of their percentage of comparative fault. In contrast, Nevada has made policy decisions to allow plaintiffs in strict liability actions to recover the full amount of their injuries regardless of fault but to prevent recovery by plaintiffs on other tort theories if their comparative fault exceeds 50%. Further, Nevada has an interest in protecting tourists who travel its roads. While these policies are indeed important, they carry less weight when they are being applied to an individual with little contact with Nevada who is seeking damages from a resident of the nonforum state for claims that arose out of that state. Thus, on balance, Arizona’s interest in having its law applied to the causes of action that an Arizona resident plaintiff raised against an Arizona car dealer outweighs Nevada’s interest in applying its own law. Section 6(2)(d) and (f) Section 6(2)(d) states that another factor relevant to a choice-of-law analysis is “the protection of justified expectations.” As previously stated, the relationship between Simmons and Chapman Auto is centered in Arizona. When Simmons purchased the car from Chapman Auto, the parties were justified in expecting that the relationship would be governed by Arizona law. Both parties were domiciled in Arizona and the transaction occurred in Arizona. Moreover, protection of this justified expectation furthers the section 6(2)(f) considerations of “certainty, predictability and uniformity of result.” Thus, the protection of both parties’ justified expectations, along with considerations of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of results, weigh in favor of applying Ari

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