F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1971) (noting that an agent has such authority as the principal, either actually or ostensibly, confers upon the agent); Miller & Rhoads v. West , 442 F. Supp. 341 (E.D. Va. 1977) (recognizing that a corporation may act as an agent); see also Romero v. Mervyn’s , 784 P.2d 992 (N.M. 1989) (explaining that even if actual authority is not present, apparent authority exists, and the principal is bound by all the acts of the agent under the apparent scope of that authority, when the principal has held the agent out as acting for the principal in a particular matter). [34] See , e.g. , Vodusek v. Bayliner Marine Corp. , 71 F.3d 148, 157 (4th Cir. 1995) (determining that spoliation remedies are available if a party or her agent, such as an expert witness, destroyed relevant evidence); Thompson ex. rel. Thompson v. Owensby , 704 N.E.2d 134, 137 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that an insurer’s knowledge of a party’s claim and the insurer’s possession of key evidence created a relationship between the insurer and the party that weighed in favor of the insurer’s duty to preserve the evidence); Koplin v. Rosel Well Perforators, Inc. , 734 P.2d 1177, 1179 (Kan. 1987) (noting that the general rule “that there is no duty to preserve possible evidence for another party” does not apply when the nonparty is bound by a special relationship with a party to the litigation, whether by agreement, contract, statute, or some other special circumstance); Garfoot , 599 N.W.2d at 420-21 (explaining in the context of evidence destroyed by an attorney’s hired expert that when a party’s agent’s agent destroys evidence, the party may be sanctioned for spoliation). [35] Edwards Indus. v. DTE/BTE, Inc. , 112 Nev. 1025, 1036, 923 P.2d 569, 576 (1996). [36] Proctor v. Castelletti , 112 Nev. 88, 90 n.1, 911 P.2d 853, 854 n.1 (1996). [37] Id. at 90, 911 P.2d at 854. [38] Id. [39] Id. at 91, 911 P.2d at 854. [40] Id. at 90, 911 P.2d at 854. ***************************** MAUPIN, J., with whom HARDESTY, J., agrees, concurring: I agree with the result reached by the majority. We have now properly retreated from the misapplication of spoliation presumptions in Reingold v. Wet ’n Wild Nevada, Inc. ,[1] and clarified the interplay between presumptions attendant to intentional destruction of evidence and inferences to be drawn in the case of non-intentional destruction. I write separately to note that the matter at hand does not present a clear case in controversy raising our questionable embrace in Banks v. Sunrise Hospital ,[2] of an absolute duty of a potential defendant in a civil case to preserve evidence. This matter likewise does not present the further questionable implication in Banks that the inference of unfavorability may provide a substitute for substantive evidence.[3] Thus, revisitation of these primary errors in Banks will have to await another case. **********FOOTNOTES********** [1] 113 Nev. 967, 944 P.2d 800 (1997). [2] 120 Nev. 822, 102 P.3d 52 (2004). [3] See Kammerer v. Sewerage & Water Bd. , 633 So. 2d 1357, 1361 (La. Ct. App. 1994) (“The traditional rule at common law will not substitute the adverse inference for plaintiff’s proof of an essential element of his or her case.”). ***************************** 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 41 May 11, 2006 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA No. 44506 GENERAL MOTORS CORPORATION, AND CHAPMAN MESA AUTO CENTER, Petitioners, vs. THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLARK, AND THE HONORABLE MICHELLE LEAVITT, DISTRICT JUDGE, Respondents, and HEATHER SIMMONS, Real Party in Interest. Original petition for a writ of mandamus challenging a district court order denying a motion to dismiss for forum non conveniens or, in the alternative, to apply Arizona law. Petition denied in part and granted in part. MAUPIN, J., dissented in part. Law Offices of Greg W. Marsh, Chtd., and Greg W. Marsh, Las Vegas; Bowman and Brooke LLP and Curtis J. Busby, Phoenix, Arizona, for Petitioner General Motors Corporation. Lincoln, Gustafson & Cercos and Thomas J. Lincoln and Loren S. Young, Las Vegas, for Petitioner Chapman Mesa Auto Center. Mainor Eglet Cottle, LLP, and Robert W. Cottle and Jennifer V. Willis, Las Vegas, for Real Party in Interest. BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC. OPINION By the Court, HARDESTY, J.: In this original writ petition, we clarify Nevada’s choice-of-law jurisprudence in tort actions. We conclude that the most significant relationship test, as provided in the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws section 145, should govern the choice-of-law analysis in tort actions unless a more specific section of the Second Restatement applies to the particular tort claim. Consequently, we no longer adhere to the choice-of-law analysis previously set forth in Motenko v. MGM Dist., Inc .[1] FACTS In April 2002, real party in interest Heather Simmons was driving her 1996 Chevrolet Metro on Interstate 15 in southern Nevada. Jerry Freeland was driving his truck a short distance ahead of Simmons. Freeland’s truck struck an object on the road that punctured his fuel tank and caused the tank to spill diesel fuel. When Simmons’ vehicle came into contact with the diesel fuel, she lost control and her vehicle overturned. As a result of the accident, Simmons was rendered a quadriplegic. Simmons is an Arizona resident. Except for the accident and spending several weeks in Nevada for medical treatment, Simmons has no contact with Nevada. After the accident, Simmons brought suit against several defendants, including petitioners General Motors Corporation (GM) and Chapman Mesa Auto Center (Chapman Auto). The complaint alleges that Simmons’ injuries were caused by, among other things, the failure of her vehicle’s roof assembly. Simmons asserts causes of action against GM and Chapman Auto for negligence, breach of implied warranty, strict liability, negligent failure to warn, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. GM is a Delaware corporation with its principal office located in Michigan. GM manufactured the 1996 Chevrolet Metro that Simmons was driving when the accident occurred. Chapman Auto is the independent auto dealer located in Arizona that sold the Chevrolet Metro to Simmons. Chapman Auto is not a GM dealer, nor is it affiliated with GM in any way. GM and Chapman Auto sought dismissal of the case for forum non conveniens or, in the alternative, to have the district court apply Arizona law. The district court denied the motion to dismiss and determined that Nevada law should apply. As a result, GM filed this petition for a writ of mandamus, challenging the district court’s order and seeking to compel the district court to dismiss the case for forum non conveniens or, in the alternative, to apply Arizona law. Chapman Auto joins in this petition. DISCUSSION The decision to entertain a petition for a writ of mandamus lies within this court’s discretion.[2] “A writ of mandamus is available to compel the performance of an act that the law requires as a duty resulting from an office, trust or station, see NRS 34.160, or to control an arbitrary or capricious exercise of discretion.”[3] A writ of mandamus is an extraordinary remedy.[4] Consequently, we will only exercise our discretion to entertain a mandamus petition when there is no “plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law”[5] or “there are either urgent circumstances or important legal issues that need clarification in order to promote judicial economy and administration.”[6] Because this case presents important choice-of-law issues that need clarification in order to promote judicial economy and administration, we exercise our discretion to entertain that part of the writ petition challenging the de

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