rve evidence is imposed once a party is on “notice” of a potential legal claim.[20] While few courts have expounded on the concept of notice, those that have conclude that a party is on notice when litigation is reasonably foreseeable.[21] For example, in Testa v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. ,[22] the First Circuit Court of Appeals upheld a trial court’s decision to issue an adverse inference instruction when the defendant could not account for certain records. In that case, in the process of delivering merchandise to the defendant, the plaintiff slipped on a snow-and-ice-coated delivery ramp, fell, and injured himself. The defendant made a detailed report of the accident and took photographs, which were later destroyed. At the time when the accident occurred, the plaintiff had threatened to sue.[23] The trial court instructed the jury that it could (but need not) draw a negative inference from the missing evidence.[24] On appeal, the First Circuit reasoned that, although evidence of good faith compliance with an established corporate document retention policy was relevant to the jury’s inquiry, the introduction of such evidence was insufficient to defeat the permissive inference instruction.[25] Instead, because the jury could reasonably conclude, based on the evidence presented, that the defendant had notice of the plaintiff’s claim and the missing records’ relevance to that claim, the adverse inference could be drawn.[26] We agree with the reasoning set forth in Turner and Testa . Our prior case law, however, has not differentiated between a rebuttable presumption for willful destruction and a permissible inference for negligently lost or destroyed evidence. In Reingold v. Wet ’n Wild Nevada, Inc. ,[27] we approved of an adverse inference instruction while concluding that the evidence at issue was willfully destroyed. In that case, the plaintiff was injured while exiting a Wet ’n Wild pool, and, although the plaintiff requested Wet ’n Wild’s records relating to prior accidents, Wet ’n Wild failed to produce them because it routinely destroyed records at the end of each season.[28] At trial, the plaintiff requested a jury instruction on which Bass-Davis based her proposed Instruction C in the instant case: Where relevant evidence which would properly be part of the case is within the control of the party whose interest it would naturally be to produce it, and he fails to do so, without satisfactory explanation, the jury may draw an inference that such evidence would have been unfavorable to him.[29] The district court refused to give the instruction, finding no evidence of Wet ’n Wild’s willful suppression of evidence, as required for an adverse presumption to apply under NRS 47.250(3), and the plaintiff appealed. This court, using two different rationales, determined that the district court committed reversible error by refusing the instruction. First, this court concluded that, under NRS 47.250(3), Wet ’n Wild had willfully suppressed the documents because it intentionally destroyed its records each season: “[d]eliberate destruction of records before the statute of limitations has run on the incidents described in those records amounts to suppression of evidence.”[30] Second, this court noted that at common law, when relevant evidence is destroyed, the jury is permitted to draw an adverse inference from the destruction.[31] Unfortunately, Reingold failed to differentiate between negligently lost or destroyed evidence and willfully suppressed evidence. As stated above, willful suppression or destruction, which triggers the rebuttable presumption under NRS 47.250(3), requires more than simple destruction of evidence and instead requires that evidence be destroyed with the intent to harm another party. Consequently, Reingold did not involve a willful suppression of evidence, and we overrule the portion of Reingold that equates willful suppression with destruction of records that, while deliberate, is not done with the intent to harm another party.[32] Instead, the evidence in Reingold was destroyed in accordance with a routine records destruction policy, and no intent to harm the opposing party was shown. Since, however, the plaintiff suffered a broken hip and left the park in an ambulance, the prospect of litigation was reasonably foreseeable. Wet ’n Wild destroyed potentially relevant records without any particularized inquiry. Therefore, the records destruction in Reingold was negligent. Although Reingold involved negligent, and not willful destruction of evidence, it correctly determined that the district court should have given an adverse inference instruction. The instant case similarly involves evidence lost through negligence, and thus, the district court should have given the adverse inference instruction, proffered as proposed Instruction C, or should have imposed another appropriate sanction. Given that Bass-Davis’ sister had requested the videotape shortly after Bass-Davis’ fall, the franchisees had sufficient notice of Bass-Davis’ potential claims. Thus, they were negligent in failing to preserve the evidence. Though the franchisees did not lose the evidence themselves, they provided the evidence to Southland, which forwarded it to its insurer, where it was lost. Since the franchisees were required to transmit this evidence under corporate policy, both Southland and its insurer were the franchisees’ agents with respect to the lost evidence.[33] The law of agency typically will allow the court to impute sanctions to a party for its agent’s actions.[34] Here, therefore, the negligence associated with losing the evidence is properly imputed to the franchisees. Collateral source rule Bass-Davis also argues that she was entitled to a new trial because the district court admitted collateral source evidence. Although we have determined that reversal is mandated based on the district court’s failure to instruct the jury, we consider this issue as well. NRCP 59(a)(7) authorizes a party to move the district court for a new trial if an error in law occurred during the trial and the moving party objected to that error. “The decision to grant or deny a motion for a new trial rests within the sound discretion of the trial court, and this court will not disturb that decision absent palpable abuse.”[35] The collateral source rule prohibits the jury from reducing the plaintiff’s damages on the ground that he received compensation for his injuries from a source other than the tortfeasor.[36] In Proctor v. Castelletti , we adopted a per se rule prohibiting “the admission of a collateral source of payment for an injury into evidence for any purpose.”[37] Collateral source evidence is prohibited because it “inevitably prejudices the jury . . . [and] greatly increases the likelihood that a jury will reduce a plaintiff’s award of damages because it knows the plaintiff is already receiving compensation.”[38] In Proctor , we held that the appellant was entitled to a new trial because the district court’s admission of collateral source evidence affected her “right to a fair trial and . . . to be fairly compensated for her injuries.”[39] During cross-examination, the franchisees’ counsel asked Bass-Davis whether she “received a paycheck” during the four-month leave of absence she took from her employment following surgery. Bass-Davis admitted that she had. Bass-Davis’ collateral source rule objection was then overruled. We conclude that this scenario fits squarely within the collateral source rule. The district court erred in admitting evidence that Bass-Davis received compensation from her employer during her leave of absence. The district court’s admission of this evidence damaged Bass-Davis’ credibility in the eyes of the jury because it suggested that Bass-Davis brought a lost wages claim for which she had already been compensated. The admission also inherently prejudiced Bass-Davis’ right to be fairly compensated for injuries cause

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