nt of patient; contents of assessment. (NRS 630.130) Before offering advice about the means or instrumentality of treatment, the licensee shall undertake an assessment of the patient. The assessment must be documented in the medical chart of the patient and should include, without limitation, the conventional methods of diagnosis ordinarily utilized by physicians in good standing practicing in the same specialty or field. The assessment may include nonconventional methods of diagnosis. The assessment must include the following: 1. An adequate medical record. 2. Documentation as to whether conventional treatment options, including, without limitation, referral options for conventional treatment, ordinarily utilized by physicians in good standing practicing in the same specialty or field have been: (a) Discussed with the patient; (b) Offered to the patient; (c) Refused by the patient; or (d) Undertaken with the patient and, if so, the outcome of the treatment. 3. If a treatment is offered which is not considered to be conventional, documentation of written informed consent by the patient for each treatment plan, including, without limitation, documentation that the risks and benefits of the use of both the conventional and the other means or instrumentality of treatment were discussed with the patient or guardian. 4. A review of the current diagnosis and conventional treatment. 5. Documentation as to whether the other means or instrumentality of treatment could interfere with any other ongoing conventional treatment. (Added to NAC by Bd. of Medical Exam’rs by R108?01, eff. 11?29?2001) NAC 630.620 Documented treatment plan. (NRS 630.130) The licensee may offer the patient any means or instrumentality of treatment other than conventional treatment if it is offered pursuant to a documented treatment plan tailored for the individual needs of the patient. The documented treatment plan must: 1. Evaluate treatment progress or success with stated objectives, including, without limitation, pain relief and improved physical or psychosocial function. 2. Consider pertinent medical history, previous medical records and physical examinations, and the need for further testing, consultations, referrals or the use of other treatment modalities. (Added to NAC by Bd. of Medical Exam’rs by R108?01, eff. 11?29?2001) NAC 630.625 Periodic reviews of care of patient. (NRS 630.130) To utilize means or instrumentalities of treatment other than conventional treatment, the licensee must document and conduct periodic reviews of the care of the patient. The periodic reviews must: 1. Consider the individual circumstances of the patient; 2. Be conducted at reasonable intervals in consideration of the individual circumstances of the patient; 3. Report the progress in reaching treatment objectives; and 4. Take into consideration the treatment prescribed, ordered or administered, as well as any new information about the etiology of the complaint. (Added to NAC by Bd. of Medical Exam’rs by R108?01, eff. 11?29?2001) NAC 630.630 Records of care provided to patient. (NRS 630.130) The licensee shall maintain complete and accurate records of the care provided to the patient, including, without limitation, the requirements of NAC 630.610 to 630.625, inclusive. (Added to NAC by Bd. of Medical Exam’rs by R108?01, eff. 11?29?2001) 122 Nev. Adv. Op. No. 39 May 11, 2006 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA No. 41015 KIMBERLY BASS-DAVIS, Appellant, vs. KATHI DAVIS AND CHRISTOPHER E. DAVIS, Respondents. Petition for en banc reconsideration of a panel decision in an appeal from a final judgment and an order denying appellant’s motion for a new trial. Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Joseph S. Pavlikowski, Senior Judge. Petition granted; reversed and remanded. Kirk-Hughes & Associates and Judith H. Braecklein and Geraldine Kirk-Hughes, Las Vegas, for Appellant. Wilson, Elser, Moskowitz, Edelman & Dicker, LLP, and Gloria J. Sturman, Las Vegas, for Respondents. BEFORE THE COURT EN BANC. OPINION By the Court, GIBBONS, J.: In this appeal, we primarily consider whether evidence that is lost after being forwarded from franchisees to their franchisor is subject to a permissive inference that the evidence would have been unfavorable if produced. On August 11, 2005, a panel of this court issued an opinion in this case. The panel concluded that the lost evidence was not “willfully suppressed” but that, based upon the facts of this case, appellant Kimberly Bass-Davis was nonetheless entitled to an inference that the lost evidence would have been unfavorable to respondents, franchisees Kathi and Christopher Davis. The panel also endorsed a jury instruction to be given when evidence that should have been preserved for trial is lost or destroyed but no evidence of willful suppression exists. The panel subsequently denied respondents’ petition for rehearing, and the respondents then filed a petition for en banc reconsideration. Pending our consideration of the petition, we withdrew the panel’s opinion on December 13, 2005. Having considered the petition, answer, and reply, we conclude that en banc reconsideration is warranted because this case involves a substantial precedential issue.[1] We therefore grant the petition and issue this opinion in place of the panel’s withdrawn opinion. In considering the issue of lost evidence, we necessarily revisit our 1997 decision in Reingold v. Wet ’n Wild Nevada, Inc.[2] In that case, we determined that the district court should have given a jury instruction allowing an adverse inference for lost evidence, as relevant evidence was spoliated when Wet ’n Wild followed its policy of routinely destroying records each season. We further concluded that Wet ’n Wild’s evidence destruction was “willful” as defined by NRS 47.250(3), thus creating a rebuttable presumption that the evidence “‘would be adverse if produced.’”[3] Given that Reingold seemingly embraced both an inference created by evidence not produced and a rebuttable presumption for evidence willfully suppressed, we take this opportunity to clarify that decision and conclude that a permissible inference that missing evidence would be adverse applies when evidence is negligently lost or destroyed. The NRS 47.250(3) presumption, on the other hand, applies only in cases involving willful suppression of evidence, in which the party destroying evidence intends to harm another party, i.e. , to obtain a competitive advantage in the matter. In this case, involving negligent loss of evidence, the district court abused its discretion by refusing to issue an adverse inference instruction or to consider other appropriate sanctions. We therefore reverse the judgment and order of the district court and remand for a new trial consistent with this opinion. FACTS On January 11, 1999, appellant Kimberly Bass-Davis slipped and fell on a wet floor inside a 7-Eleven convenience store. Bass-Davis claims that she slipped because a 7-Eleven employee had mopped the floor but failed to post warning signs. After the fall, she sought medical attention and was diagnosed with numerous injuries, ultimately requiring surgery. Bass-Davis incurred medical bills in excess of $201,000. Within one week of Bass-Davis’ fall, Bass-Davis’ sister contacted the franchise operators, Kathi and Christopher Davis (the franchisees) and requested copies of the store’s incident report, documenting Bass-Davis’ fall, and the surveillance videotape from inside the store. The franchisees referred Bass-Davis’ sister to a Southland employee, whom she contacted, repeating her request to no avail. Bass-Davis later filed a complaint against the franchisees and, during discovery, she learned that the franchisees could not locate the surve

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