of the existence of the presumed fact. 2. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the evidence does not render the existence of the basic facts more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find against the existence of the presumed fact. 3. If reasonable minds would not necessarily agree as to whether the evidence renders the existence of the basic facts more probable than not, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an instruction to find in favor of the existence of the presumed fact if they find from the evidence that the existence of the basic facts is more probable than not, but otherwise to find against the existence of the presumed fact. (Added to NRS by 1971, 777) NRS 47.200 Determination on evidence of presumed fact: Where basic facts established. When reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the evidence renders the existence of the basic facts more probable than not, but direct evidence is introduced contrary to the existence of the presumed fact, the question of the existence of the presumed fact is determined as follows: 1. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find against the existence of the presumed fact. 2. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct evidence does not render the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find in favor of the presumed fact. 3. If reasonable minds would not necessarily agree as to whether the direct evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an instruction to find in favor of the existence of the presumed fact unless they find from the direct evidence that its nonexistence is more probable than its existence, in which event they should find against its existence. (Added to NRS by 1971, 778) NRS 47.210 Determination on evidence of presumed fact: Where basic facts lacking. When reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the evidence does not render the existence of the basic facts more probable than not, but direct evidence is introduced concerning the existence of the presumed fact, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an instruction to determine the existence of the presumed fact from the direct evidence without reference to the presumption. (Added to NRS by 1971, 778) NRS 47.220 Determination on evidence of presumed fact: Where basic facts doubtful. When reasonable minds would not necessarily agree as to whether the evidence renders the existence of the basic facts more probable than not, and direct evidence is introduced concerning the existence of the presumed fact, the question of the existence of the presumed fact is determined as follows: 1. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct evidence renders the existence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find in favor of the existence of the presumed fact. 2. If reasonable minds would necessarily agree that the direct evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall direct the jury to find against the existence of the presumed fact. 3. If reasonable minds would not necessarily agree that the direct evidence renders the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, the judge shall submit the matter to the jury with an instruction to find in favor of the existence of the presumed fact if they find from the evidence that the existence of the basic facts is more probable than not and unless they find the nonexistence of the presumed fact more probable than not, otherwise to find against the existence of the presumed fact. (Added to NRS by 1971, 778) NRS 47.230 Presumptions against accused in criminal actions. 1. In criminal actions, presumptions against an accused recognized at common law or created by statute, including statutory provisions that certain facts are prima facie evidence of other facts or of guilt, are governed by this section. 2. The judge shall not direct the jury to find a presumed fact against the accused. When the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, the judge may submit the question of guilt or of the existence of the presumed fact to the jury, if, but only if, a reasonable juror on the evidence as a whole, including the evidence of the basic facts, could find guilt or the presumed fact beyond a reasonable doubt. Under other presumptions, the existence of the presumed fact may be submitted to the jury if the basic facts are supported by substantial evidence, or are otherwise established, unless the evidence as a whole negatives the existence of the presumed fact. 3. Whenever the existence of a presumed fact against the accused is submitted to the jury, the judge shall give an instruction that the law declares that the jury may regard the basic facts as sufficient evidence of the presumed fact but does not require it to do so. In addition, if the presumed fact establishes guilt or is an element of the offense or negatives a defense, the judge shall instruct the jury that its existence must, on all the evidence, be proved beyond a reasonable doubt. (Added to NRS by 1971, 779) NRS 47.240 Conclusive presumptions. The following presumptions, and no others, are conclusive: 1. A malicious and guilty intent, from the deliberate commission of an unlawful act, for the purpose of injuring another. 2. The truth of the fact recited, from the recital in a written instrument between the parties thereto, or their successors in interest by a subsequent title, but this rule does not apply to the recital of a consideration. 3. Whenever a party has, by his own declaration, act or omission, intentionally and deliberately led another to believe a particular thing true and to act upon such belief, he cannot, in any litigation arising out of such declaration, act or omission, be permitted to falsify it. 4. A tenant is not permitted to deny the title of his landlord at the time of the commencement of the relation. 5. The judgment or order of a court, when declared by titles 2, 3 and 6 of NRS to be conclusive; but such judgment or order must be alleged in the pleadings if there is an opportunity to do so; if there is no such opportunity, the judgment or order may be used as evidence. 6. Any other presumption which, by statute, is expressly made conclusive. (Added to NRS by 1971, 779) NRS 47.250 Disputable presumptions. All other presumptions are disputable. The following are of that kind: 1. That an unlawful act was done with an unlawful intent. 2. That a person intends the ordinary consequences of his voluntary act. 3. That evidence willfully suppressed would be adverse if produced. 4. That higher evidence would be adverse from inferior being produced. 5. That money paid by one to another was due to the latter. 6. That a thing delivered by one to another belonged to the latter. 7. That things which a person possesses are owned by him. 8. That a person is the owner of property from exercising acts of ownership over it, or from common reputation of his ownership. 9. That official duty has been regularly performed. 10. That a court or judge, acting as such, whether in this State or any other state or country, was acting in the lawful exercise of his jurisdiction. 11. That a judicial record, when not conclusive, does still correctly determine or set forth the rights of the parties. 12. That a writing is truly dated. 13. That a letter duly directed and mailed was received in the regular course of the mail. 14. That a person

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